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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

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The Spring Fellowship Meeting

Between forty and eighty people attended the five sessions of the Spring Fellowship Meeting held at Riverside Church, New York, on May 22-23. The opening session was devoted to the problem of what the church as church could do in regard to the race issue and was led by Professor John Knox of Union Seminary. The main emphasis lay on establishing within the Christian communion genuine symbols and realities of the universal character of the church. In the second meeting Prof. Tillich gave a comprehensive survey of the situation of Protestantism in a collectivist age in which he came to the conclusion that there was an "eternal Protestant" principle which would be valid in any age. The third meeting was devoted to a further discussion of the statement of principles of the Fellowship. Professors Bennett and Tillich were appointed a committee to make the suggested changes in the statement and the gratitude of the Fellowship was voted to Professor Mollegan for the splendid work which he has done in preparing the statement.

In the fourth session Prof. Heimann surveyed the European situation in general and Prof. Bennett dealt particularly with the German problem. In the final session R. Niebuhr reviewed the relation of our Christian resources to the world crisis. The worship services were conducted by Mrs. Ursula Niebuhr, Rev. Tate of Alexandria and Rev. Peter Apelian, the new chairman of the executive committee.

EDITOR

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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EDITORIALS

International Ideals and Realities

The Federal Council of Churches has its "Six Pillars of Peace". The Joint Statement of Protestants, Catholics and Jews announces its "Pattern of Peace" with its seven principles. The British churches have their joint and separate statements. The various denominational conventions meet and all solemnly announce that the peace of the world must be based upon the law of love.

One is struck by an air of unreality in all these ideal pronouncements. The sense of unreality becomes the greater when one confers with any group of correspondents who carefully watch the actual course of international events. For the fact is that while the churches and other institutions of the ideal rightly interpret the moral requirements of the international community and also correctly voice the moral aspirations of the people, the actual trend of events stands in almost complete contradiction to these ideals.

We need a world community; but the drift is toward spheres of influence and unilateral security. Russia is more interested in a strong line of strategic defense in Eastern Europe than in a system of mutual security. Britain is not certain that she can count on America to remain in the peace. For this and other reasons she is consolidating her sphere of influence in the Mediterranean world. America meanwhile insists that

we must have naval and air bases everywhere in the world. We will need them to support the largest military and naval establishment in our history and one which will probably be larger than that of any other nation.

The statesmen continue to talk vaguely about some form of United Nations organization; but nothing is done to give it meaning and effect during the war. We know that the larger nations must bear the primary responsibility for world order; but we also know that if they do not draw the smaller nations into a general organization with genuine constitutional principles of rights and duties, the world will soon rebel against the hegemony of the great world powers. Yet we offer continual affront to the provisional French government and are already building up DeGaulle as a leader not only of French but of continental opposition to the leadership of the great powers.

The chasm between our hopes and the realities is, in other words, immense. The ideals do not seem to engage the realities. Whenever this is the case the consequence is sentimentality. The ideals of good people are already full of the corruption of sentimentality. In the days of our youth, fathers often beguiled small boys by allowing them to hold the reins behind their own firm hands, giving them the illusion that they were driving the horse. In the present situation a few statesmen are holding the reins,

while a lot of small boys are futilely playing as if they were driving.

A part of this unreality is derived from the fact that the actual mechanics of statesmanship in war-time is withdrawn from the democratic process and works in secret. Decisions are made under the pressure of military necessity; but the military decisions carry a full weight of political implications. They tend to establish certain trends which will not be easily reversed.

A part of the contrast between the ideals and the realities is directly derived from the uncertainty about American policy. America throws such tremendous power into the affairs of the world community in times of crisis; and yet is so unpredictable after the crisis. There is no certainty as yet, that America is ready for continuing responsibility in international relations. Even if the sentiment of the nation were overwhelmingly for such responsibility, our constitutional difficulties make it uncertain that the will of the majority will prevail. For the United States Senate must ratify treaties; and one-third of the Senate can frustrate the will of the majority; and states which represent less than one-tenth of our population can easily produce that third of the senate vote. The rest of the world, particularly Britain, is more conscious than we of these constitutional difficulties.

But the real cause between our ideals and the drift of things in the world community lies deeper. It is the same old contradiction between "the law that is in our members" and the "law that is in our minds" which is always found in human existence. We consciously desire world order; but unconsciously each nation seeks certain advantages for itself. We want peace; but America also wants to

prove that it is now the most powerful nation on earth, economically and in military and naval strength. Russia wants peace; but it also wants to prove that it has become a great power and that the years of its exclusion from international counsels must be atoned. Britain wants peace and needs mutual security more desperately, or at least more obviously, than the other two great powers; but she also fears the greater potential power of the two adolescent giants, linked up with her in world leadership. It is rather natural that she should hold on rather desperately to all the scattered political sources of power she has in the world and to seek to augment them in the fashion suggested by Field Marshall Smuts.

Thus each one of the great powers seeks its own security first; and there is danger that a genuine system of collective security will be destroyed in the process. Furthermore there is some evidence that some of the small powers, including France, will be so intent upon reestablishing themselves that they will have less than adequate interest in world order. In short, the law that is in our members is the spirit of nationalism; while the immediate meaning of the "law of God" in which we "delight after the inward man" is the obligation toward world community.

A special case of the same hiatus between the two laws appears in our attitude toward the prospective vanquished nations. The churches have all made splendid statements on the perils of vindictiveness. But it is quite obvious that the peace will be corrupted by vindictiveness. Mr. Churchill assures us that the victorious nations will insist on the policy of unconditional surrender which "offers Germany no rights though it re-

lieves us of no duties". Yet where there is no mutuality of rights and duties there can be no justice.

The chasm between the law in our members and the law that is in our minds can not be completely overcome. It represents the self-contradiction in which human life stands. Yet it could be overcome to a greater degree politically if it were more fully understood religiously. In terms of religious discernment we ought to stop insisting that the primary concern of religion is the admonition that nations obey the moral law. With this emphasis we are still fighting Nazism rather than our own sins. The Nazis explicitly defied the idea of a law to which nations ought to be subject. But the so-called civilized and democratic nations explicitly accept such a law and implicitly deny it. Their sin is not moral cynicism but moral hypocrisy. The primary concern of the Christian church ought to be to make "good" nations conscious of their secret treason toward their own ideals. Otherwise the idealists of the democratic world will continue to save the world by elaborating perfect international ideals, while the impulses of the nations all drive the world in the opposite direction.

From such religious insights a political strategy could develop which will tend to close the gap between moral ideals and political realities. It will make use of every ideal impulse and sense of obligation beyond the egoistic interest; but it will also harness and deflect the egoistic interest when necessary. A world community can not be established if nations do not recognize some law beyond their interest. But neither will it be established if statesmanship does not find the point of concurrence between self-interest or national interest and the gen-

eral welfare, which is, in this case, the peace of the world community.

* *

The Negro Issue In America

The increasing tension between Negroes and whites in America is proof of the fact that basic social issues become more complicated in the very process of their solution. The Negroes have more rights in this war than in the last one. Yet they are more resentful of the injustice done them. The reason for the increasing resentment undoubtedly lies in the fact that a much larger number of Negroes have by education and other advances achieved the ability to resent and to resist injustice than in the past. If a community desires to keep a race in permanent subjection it can only do so by consistent Nazi methods. It must destroy the capacity to resist injustice among those who suffer from it.

The tortuous process of democratic justice fortunately makes it impossible for a total community to follow the principles of discrimination which one part of the community would like to apply. Thus the best impulses of our democratic society have expressed themselves in providing ever increasing educational advantages to the Negro race, even while our worst impulses express themselves in seeking to prevent those higher forms of justice which this more equal education makes logical and necessary.

Increasing race tension is due, however, not merely to increasing resentment among Negroes but also to increasing fear among the proponents of "white supremacy" who feel their privileged position in a caste society imperiled and who become more and more desperate in seeking to ward off further concessions of justice. This is why certain reactionary white southerners express themselves

more and more hysterically in their attitude toward the race question. This is particularly apparent in the southern opposition to the elimination of "poll tax" restrictions upon the franchise and in the recent hysteria occasioned by the decision of the Supreme court that Negroes have a right to vote in the primaries of southern states. We must expect this tension to heighten until it reaches its climax after the war. The frightened reactionaries regard the returning Negro soldier as a particular threat to their peace, and not without reason. For it is undoubtedly a fact that the Negro soldier in America has conceived a profound resolve to claim some of the democratic justice for which they have been fighting a foreign foe.

No easy solution can be offered for this vexatious problem. All the spiritual resources of our nation will be required to effect even a tolerable minimal solution by achieving some advances in justice between the races and yet avoiding overt conflict.

It may be worth observing that at the present moment the Christian church is making no great contribution to the solution of this issue. The churches of the North absolve their conscience by passing idealistic resolutions in which all race discrimination is condemned. Most of the churches of the south are completely enslaved and cowed by the prevailing hysteria. There are fortunately leavening minorities in the South in the universities and the churches, who are doing what they can to lessen the tension and to mitigate the pride and the fear of the white man.

There are several tasks which the church might perform in terms of its own peculiar genius which would make its idealism more relevant to the present situation. If, for instance, the church

were to make a rigorous religious analysis of the motives which underly the white man's pride and fear, if it allowed the word of God to be sharper than a two edged sword, if it searched the conscience of men in the light of that word, it might help white people to see to what degree the very hysteria of their attack upon the Negro is the evidence of an uneasy conscience.

It is not possible to travel in the South or to mix in the complex race relations of a Northern municipality without noticing that the most brazen forms of injustice are partly due to the effort of men of disquiet conscience to hide the uneasiness of their inner life. Even the worst sinners against God's law of brotherhood have some testimony in their inner life to the wrong they do. Such uneasiness may prompt repentance; but it may also prompt despair; and despair may express itself in frantic professions of righteousness and unjust attacks upon the minority. Only religiously astute and profound pastors of the souls of men understand to what degree men make public accusation against their fellows in order to cover up the secret accusations which the dispossessed make against them in God's sight. Cain protests the more loudly that he is not his brother's keeper because he knows in the secret of his heart that he is.

The preaching of the ideal possibilities of brotherhood which is not accompanied by a careful and pitiless analysis of the motives, of the inner fears, self-accusations and self-justifications of those who deny brotherhood is not religious. It moves on the plane of secular idealism and does not bring the terror of the judgment's of the living God to bear upon the soul. Only if this is done, can the mercy of God also heal the hurt which men have in their own heart and

which prompts them to hurt each other.

There is one other point at which the church fails miserably in its attack upon the race issue today. It is always calling upon the community to abolish this or that discrimination; but it makes no contrite admission of the fact that the church in America is almost consistently "Jim Crow" in its pattern of segregation. There are few cities of the South in which even ministers of the same denomination have any fellowship across race lines. Even in the Northern churches there is frequently no fellowship below the level of the general conference of the entire church.

The real fact is that the Christian church in America lacks even minimally adequate symbols of the reality of a community of grace which does not recognize race as basic to its fellowship. In the south denominational divisions are still so strong that there is little fellowship even between white pastors and congregations across denominational lines. Protestantism thus reveals its pathetic particularism and proves that the forces of history, whether they be racial or national, cultural or economic, can divide it without the church having the power and the grace to preserve even a symbol of its ultimate unity in Christ. It might be well for the church to make fewer ideal demands upon the community for a while and center upon this problem in its own life. If the church is the body of Christ, and if in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, there must be some dimension in the life of the church where this is recognized and actualized. If it is not, the church ceases to be a true church. If the salt has lost its savour, if the inner life of the church has ceased to be a real leaven in society, it can not hide that fact by making brave and idealistic public pronouncements.

Let the church approach the race issue with greater humility and perhaps some fruits mete for repentance will develop in its own life.

* *

Three Elements In Papal Leadership

The Pope's address to the College of Cardinals on June 2 is a remarkable document and also a very typical one; for it combines three elements which are characteristic of Roman Christianity. It pleads for the city of Rome; it makes the traditional claims for the primacy of the Bishop of Rome over all of Christendom; and it makes some thoroughly Christian observations on the conduct of the war. Thus it combines the Roman, the Papal and the Christian elements which constitute Catholicism as we know it.

In regard to Rome the Pope declares: "If at the moment our anxiety is especially for Rome it is because such sentiments are evoked by the pitiable conditions in which a large part of the population of the city, which is also our diocese, finds itself". This special anxiety is natural enough, though the conditions in Rome are probably no more pitiable than those under which the Pope's children, let us say, in Poland, suffer. This may be put down as the local patriotism which qualifies the Pope's universal loyalties.

The genuinely Christian observations on war policies are expressed as follows: "In many is born the impression or the fear that there may not be, even for the peoples and nations as such, any alternative but this: A complete victory or complete destruction. When once this sharp dilemma has entered men's minds, its baneful influence is a stimulant for the prolongation of the war. Even among those who by natural impulse or for realistic considerations would be disposed to a reasonable peace, the spectre

of the alternative and the conviction of the real or supposed will of the enemy to destroy national life to the very roots, smothers all other reflections and instills in many the courage of desperation." This is the Pope's wise criticism of the Allied policy of "unconditional surrender". It is a pertinent criticism and is informed by genuine Christian presuppositions.

It is rather strange and interesting how the Papal address combines with these immediate concerns the presentation of the ancient claim of the primacy of the Holy See. The argument is, as usual, that the Pope has inherited from Peter the promise of Christ that he would build his church upon this rock. "Between Christ and Peter" declares the Pope, "there reigns from the days of the promise near Cesare Phillipi—a mysterious but eminently real bond which was affected once in time but draws its roots from the eternal counsels of the Almighty". The entire Papal argument is a proof of the fact that in all debates, the important point is the presuppositions upon which the conflicting arguments proceed. Granted that the words of Christ were meant personally for Peter, and granted that Peter was the first bishop of Rome (a particularly questionable presupposition) and granted that there is a mystical and magical bond between the first and the last Bishop of Rome, the argument may seem irrefutable. It is of course implausible to all who are unable to accept the presuppositions.

For the Pope no unity of Christendom is possible, if all those who "profess themselves Christians" do not accept this Papal claim. There is something rather pathetic about the Papal hope that he may persuade errant Protestants to ac-

cept this claim; for it proves how little he understands the irrevocable character of certain historical events, which have made these ancient Papal claims implausible.

"How much more potent," declares the Pope, "would be the influence of Christian thought and life on the moral substructure of the future plans for peace and reconstruction if there were not this vast dispersal and division of religious confessions, that in the course of time have detached themselves from Mother Church!" We are not so sure. The Christian gospel validates itself finally not so much by the unanimity of its contemporary witness as by the profundity of its appeal. An authoritarian unity is always a peril to this profundity, for it achieves harmony by sacrificing facets of the gospel testimony which do not fit into the prevailing scheme. Suppose all of Christendom were now united under the Pope! Would then not the whole of Christendom be committed to the proposition that the integrity of the church must be the first consideration of statescraft; and would we then not support any government which allows the church to live and attack every government which is inimical to the church, no matter how important its collaboration for a peace system might be?

* *

Judgment and Forgiveness.

Nowhere is religious insight more necessary to overcome the fury of a too simple moralism than in the treatment of a fallen foe. Already we are engulfed with demands of moralists that vanquished nations must be taught their lesson by this or that form of punishment. Most of these counsels proceed from a complete lack of religious appreciation of the

immensity of the tragedy in which the world is involved.

In one sense Germany has committed a crime against civilization so great that no punishment is adequate. That is true, incidentally, of many crimes less terrible than the German tyranny. We do punish murderers by death or life-long imprisonment; but if we look deeply into this procedure we must become aware of the inability of any man or society to overcome evil by justice. The punishment may be necessary as a deterrent of future crime; but it cannot "make good" the evil which the crime has done. It does not restore the dead to life. The comparative impotence of the punishment ought to teach us the weakness of man when dealing with the ultimate issues of life. The justice and the forgiveness which are necessary to overcome evil in history are in God's hands, and not ours. This does not preclude the necessity of doing what we can to deter crime and to restore criminals. But we ought to know how piddling all our little plans are in comparison with the ultimate issues involved.

In another sense a defeated nation is punished so severely that our efforts to add or detract from the punishment are also pretentious. Few of us stop to consider what it means for a nation to suffer the moral, political and economic breakdown which is concomitant with defeat. This has become particularly true in the day of total wars. The defeat of a "total" dictatorship in a "total" war must result in a "total" breakdown, the dimensions of which will astound us as much as the dimensions of the war itself. We make our nice plans for punishment now, but when the time comes we will be hard put to preserve even the most minimal order in Germany. The problem of

averting total chaos will be so great that many nicely laid plans will be forgotten.

From the standpoint of any ordinary justice it would be important to force Germany to restore its spoils and to "make good" its awful destruction of other peoples property. The lives, of course, cannot be restored. A little may be done to restore property; but meanwhile Germany is being subjected to the "total" destruction of cities, and that process will make "indemnities" even more irrelevant than last time.

Proposals for the punishment of individual criminals are also in the category of comparative futility. Undoubtedly the real initiators of the horrible tortures to which the people of the occupied territories have been subjected ought to be destroyed. Undoubtedly many of them will be tried and condemned by means more swift than any legal court. Terrible as the consequences of such "lynching" may be, terrible that is in the inexactness of punishment, it must nevertheless be hoped that most of the individual criminals will be punished in that way. For if we begin to try them in courts, by what law shall we try them? And by what standards shall we distinguish individual from collective guilt? Shall we punish the lieutenant who obeyed an order or the general who gave the order? Every effort to deal individually with the complex realities of collective guilt may become grotesque in the final analysis. Here too we face tragedies too deep for any system of morals or law.

Incidentally it is to be hoped that the punishment of individual criminals will not deflect us from the task of breaking the power of a military and predatory caste in Germany, older than Nazism, more "gentlemanly" in personal conduct than the Gestapo, and more dangerous

to the future because its traditions are not as obviously evil as Nazism and therefore more capable of surviving.

Wherever we turn we find the problem of punishment deeper than our wisdom can comprehend or our power can solve. We dare not forget either that we still live in a state of international anarchy, which means that there are no impartial courts. Men are therefore forced to be "judges in their own case". Since there are no impartial courts we have to do the best we can; but we ought not to do it without some contrite sense of the temptation to self-righteous fury involved in this procedure. It is a terrible thing to equate victory with righteousness and defeat with iniquity, however rightfully we may feel that our victory was necessary for the triumph of righteousness.

The final perplexity in punishing a defeated foe arises from the fact that a community of nations can adopt neither the short cut of execution nor of incarceration which national societies adopt in dealing with criminals. The incarceration of criminals, including life-imprisonment for those who are hopelessly criminal, is a necessary procedure in national societies. But it is impossible for international societies, even if it were possible to designate a criminal nation as hopeless. Europe can not be made into a jail, if for no other reason than that it would destroy the last vestige of sanity in the prisoner and taint the jailors with insanity also.

The international community has fewer resources of justice than a national community; yet it requires higher ones. Therein lies our dilemma. We must restore the criminal to the community of nations or perish with him in his insanity.

Since the political instruments for such a high form of remedial justice are

minimal, it becomes the more important to set the whole procedure under profound religious insights. If we do not understand the relevance of the Scriptural injunction "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord" we will mess up the process of justice which has gone on under the providence of God, through the terrible realities of our history, by our own piddling little schemes.

* *

The Janus-Faced Republicans

There are some pathetic repetitions in history. In 1916 Charles Evans Hughes ran as Republican opponent to Woodrow Wilson and had the support of the internationalists on the eastern seaboard while seeking also for the support of the isolationists in the middle west. He was defeated by a narrow margin. In 1920 Harding secured the support of Republican internationalists by promising some kind of association of nations, while he held the support of middle western isolationists by rejecting the League of Nations.

In 1944 Governor Dewey is playing the same game. His opposition to lend-lease and his quasi-isolationism of the past will make him more acceptable than Roosevelt to the middle west. But in the east he will make nice speeches on the necessity of international cooperation. Undoubtedly a respectable committee of Republican internationalists will be set up to assure the country that the best way to guarantee American participation in international affairs is to elect Mr. Dewey.

The reason for this perpetual ambiguity on foreign policy of the Republican party lies in the fact that the business world is divided between those who have large stakes in American participation in world affairs and that part of the

business community which manufactures primarily for a home market and represents the economic pull toward isolationism. It must be added that since the days of Abraham Lincoln the farmers have been wedded in an unnatural alliance with big business in the Republican party. Roosevelt destroyed this alliance by weening the farmers away from the Republican party. But the farmers have been lost to the New Deal, partly because they do not agree with Roosevelt's foreign policy.

All this does not mean that Roosevelt will be defeated. But it will be a tight squeeze. Nor does it mean that a fourth term is desirable. It is acceptable only in the light of the alternative.

We are afraid that a fourth term New Deal will be a pretty sorry affair. The President will probably be elected by the help of millions, including southern reactionaries, who will fight his domestic program as soon as he is elected. The lack of parliamentary responsibility in our constitutional forms makes it impossible for a conflict between the executive and the congress to be composed. We may therefore face a serious stalemate in our federal government in the next four years if Roosevelt is elected. Yet most people who believe that America must assume her full share of responsi-

bility for world order will vote for Mr. Roosevelt rather than run the risk of putting the Republicans in power.

* *

Labor and Foreign Policy

One of the real hazards to a democratic foreign policy is that labor is so little interested in international affairs and, on the whole so ignorant of the issues. In America the CIO has a research department which does excellent work on domestic policy but nothing is done on foreign affairs. This is partly due to the fact that the split in the CIO between communists and anti-communists makes it difficult to agree on some world program, which must of course come to terms with the problem of Russia in the post-war world.

In the AFL the anti-communist bias of the European social democrats reinforces the general conservatism of the Federation. Despite this fact the AFL has presented a quite acceptable "Post-War Program" chiefly through the leadership of Prof. Childs, the new leader of the "Liberal Party" of New York. The only difficulty with the program is that it is devoted to the maintenance of "free enterprise" in terms which would suggest that its program emanated from the National Manufacturers' Association.

A CHRISTIAN INSIGHT INTO POST-WAR ECONOMICS

By CHARLES D. KEAN

We live in an age which is conscious of the importance of economics to an extent which has been true of no previous age. The man in the street is daily bombarded with economic arguments in newspaper columns, magazine articles and paid advertisements. Most of the more widely-known post-war plans present economic programs. The economics presented over the radio and in the press covers a rather wide range of theory. Much of it is obviously popularized and over-simplified. A good many of the arguments would not stand up to sharp critical analysis. Nevertheless, there is a growing kind of popular opinion, common to many varieties of political thought, that economic issues are the primary issues of the war, and that consequently the settlement both at home and abroad will primarily involve economic factors. What has been the dominant cultural factor for the past few centuries has become publicly overt and self-conscious.

The red-faced, bleary-eyed soldier who has been staring at magazine readers from airplanes, fox-holes and stretchers under the auspices of the Nash-Kelvinator Company for the past two years voices an economic theory. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau gives the public a lesson in popular economics in a War Bond sales advertisement for industrial workers—"Squeeze that money, brother, it's mine, too." And on a more seriously scientific level, the publications of committees and groups ranging from the National Association of Manu-

facturers and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States to the late National Resources Planning Board and the C. I. O. Post-War Policy Committee present arguments as to the economic nature of the war and the settlement to come.

While some of the material on the subject appears to advocate some simple panacea, the great bulk of the material which has come to this writer's desk seems to indicate an awareness that the economic problem is complex as well as serious and must be met with organized, deliberate effort. With the more serious advocates of post-war planning the spectre of unemployment is constantly present to emphasize the urgency of the task so that they work in an atmosphere not only of planning for victory but also of fearing defeat in spite of victory. Yet at the same time there is the tendency for them to believe that some particular line of attack, whether it be planning by industrialists for maximum employment, or a broader basis for social security, or a reorganization of international finance, or the development of a more genuine industrial democracy through management-worker councils, or some other plan or combination of plans, if pushed with sufficient intelligence and aggressiveness will achieve the desired result—the removal of the problem.

The widespread faith that tinkering with or drastically revising (depending upon one's point of view) the economic system is the means by which the post-war era may become an age of peace, plenty and prosperity is found among

thinkers of the Right, Center and Left. It is what should be expected from an economic culture. Therefore, as we view the theories and programs offered, both the popular appeals in advertising and the more detailed pamphlets for the serious-minded, we are struck by certain manifestations of an economic society which are vitally important. No matter how conscientious a planner may be, it is very difficult for him to realize the significance of history, and therefore it is consequently even more difficult for him to deal with the fundamental implications raised by his own analysis. It is no impugning of the value of economic studies to point out that an economic culture always tends to view its problems in terms of cause and effect in which man, as man in any appreciation of his dimensions, becomes secondary to economic forces. An economic culture always tends to deal with historical issues on the basis of economics conceived as if it were mechanics—this is the problem, these are the causes, this removes the causes, and consequently the problem no longer exists. To view post-war economic planning, which certainly is vitally important, without an awareness of the cumulative problem of history is to make it difficult if not impossible to deal with the serious economic issues involved.

There is wide agreement among many advocates of differing schools of thought that unemployment is the spectre at the feast of victory, perhaps not immediately but eventually. There is a rather general awareness among political and economic thinkers that unemployment presents the problem which is key to the solution of many other economic and political problems. We agree with those who recognize that unemployment is the key economic problem to be faced in the post-war world. We wish the awareness

were even wider, because unemployment is a major symptom not only of an economic but also of a more fundamental cultural dislocation. But since unemployment is a symptom, albeit a severe and serious one, it cannot be approached as if solving it by itself would create a tolerable society. And certainly the solution of the unemployment issue does not mean the redemption of history. On the other hand, to consider the problem of unemployment realistically and to tackle it aggressively against the background of history can serve to illumine the true human situation and to challenge the basic premises of an economic culture.

The most obvious reason that the problem of unemployment remains to be a basic consideration in the post-war era is that none of the causes of the depression of the 30's have been dealt with fundamentally. The present war, to which the depression contributed and which has a common background with the depression in history, has temporarily shelved the urgency of meeting the problem. And the reason that the causes of the depression were not dealt with fundamentally is not that nothing was done. We know that a great deal was attempted along a variety of lines both in America and abroad. It is rather that inasmuch as the issue was more profound than one of economics per se it could not be dealt with adequately on the basis of economics nor of politics conceived of as primarily the organ of economics. And when this observation is made, it does not say that the economic situation itself was either adequately understood or intelligently approached. To some extent it was and to some extent it was not. It is to say that the economic problem, symptomized by unemployment, as far as it was dealt with at all, was met

in such a way that the ambiguities of the situation were part and parcel of the treatment with consequent confusion. In an economic society nothing else should have been expected.

The Christian social thinker, however, cannot be content with a denunciation of economic culture. He still lives in history and even in protest he is part of that culture. Because he takes history seriously and appreciates its cumulative problem, he must therefore be prepared to understand the economic issues on their own level in order that his insight may be relevant to the world in which he lives, but at the same time, he avoids making the economic interpretation normative for experience as a whole. To do this he must keep abreast of the changing circumstances of the economic situation, refusing to accept uncritically even the economic as against the ideological content of traditional theories of interpretation—Marx, George, the Co-operative movement or any other. In criticizing proposals for world reconstruction which tend to oversimplify the situation by thinking of it in primarily economic terms, he is on his guard against the use of an over-simplified economics himself.

Unemployment has been described as a major symptom of the dislocation of modern culture, and unemployment is obviously rooted in the economic situation. Both the Beveridge report and the NRPB proposals stated that their programs required stabilized employment conditions as prerequisite for effectiveness. The American industrialists' group, called the Committee for Economic Development, is undertaking as its major program the creation of maximum employment—what amounts to a 15 percent increase over 1939—by industrial planning, clearly describing un-

employment as the major crisis facing American industry in the post-war years. Neither the Beveridge nor the NRPB reports went into the answer for unemployment, as that was not within their scope, although one of the last two NRPB reports did give attention to the transitional aspects of the problem during the period of mustering men out of the armed services and the re-tooling of industry. The Committee for Economic Development attacks unemployment as its major problem. Other groups, ranging from the NAM to the CIO, give it very serious attention.

It would be a mistake for us to look with jaundiced eye upon all proposals emanating from the Right. On the level of history, while we must not be blind to ideological factors, we are primarily concerned with factual material and are therefore aware that contributions to the economic picture may be made from many quarters just because of that very factor of ideology. In dealing with unemployment on the level of economics, within history, we are concerned with why men become unemployed through economic causes, although we will try to avoid the mistake of thinking that such an analysis will illumine completely the cultural dislocation. Both Right and Left and the Centre, too, have contributions to make to our understanding of the economic level.

In his thirty-year old classic study, "The Cause and Cure of Unemployment", Sir William Beveridge listed four independent yet interlocking causes, each one of which still contributes to the problem. This writer would like to expand Sir William's list to seven. The original four were: 1. the business cycle; 2. unnecessary seasonality; 3. chaotic employer-employee relations in the labor market, and 4. technological

unemployment. To these are added: 5. inefficient and wasteful planning for both men and material; 6. international and national activities in restraint of trade, and 7. the administered-price technique. It should be obvious that all seven interlock and that the seven together include every aspect of national and international economy—from money-markets to engineering.

Any attack on unemployment from the economic level must include a simultaneous attack on all seven fronts if it is not to be self-defeating from purely economic causes. While it is true that "the profit motive" is the most seriously aggravating factor in all seven areas, it does not follow that its elimination would by itself solve or even make possible the solution of the whole problem. For instance, it would make an immediate and direct contribution to issues 1 and 6, and an immediate although indirect contribution to issues 2, 3 and 7, but not necessarily any contribution to issues 4 and 5 unless one subscribes to the theory that efficient economics has an automatic determinant effect upon politics. Yet "the profit motive" remains the chief aggravating factor of unemployment in a capitalist controlled economic society, partly because its ideological effect tends to make impossible the simultaneous realistic facing of the seven areas, and therefore "the profit motive" must be faced realistically in any attempt to solve unemployment.

The obverse of "the profit motive" criticism is that of "production for use". Again this offers a potential parallel contribution to the solution of the seven factors, but such a phrase as "production for use" frequently leads its user into an economic cul de sac in which he ends up committed to the proposition that underconsumption is the basic cause of

unemployment. The spiral relationship of underconsumption through inequitable distribution to unemployment is one of those descriptions of economic practice which is largely true but in the last analysis misleading in that it leaves out certain important factors in the total picture. It goes without saying that improvements along this line are desperately needed and can do much to ameliorate the situation, but it does not follow that a solution of the problem of underconsumption by means of "production for use", achieved through a redistribution of economic control, whether communal or co-operative, will be the entire answer even on the economic level. It may sound ridiculous, but underproduction is related to underconsumption in an age of high technology not as an automatic concomitant but as an interacting factor.

A great difficulty of the modern economic culture is that groups which have discovered some valid point or points of criticism in the field tend to act on the belief that they have the basic answer, and hence to become doctrinaire. The partial nature of programs of the Left is more obviously duplicated by the partial nature of the programs of the Center and Right. The Committee for Economic Development concentrates on factor 5, where certainly much can be done. Some 15 years ago two prominent economists and two business men produced a book, "Can Business Prevent Unemployment?" in which they turned their fire on the manifold implications of the deceptively simple factor 2. The Business Cycle factor has been subjected to innumerable studies from all sides and is involved to some extent in the international monetary proposals of Keynes, Morgenthau and others. Factor 4, technological unemployment, has come in

for a lot of attention. Pronouncements from Church groups, such as the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches and the seven-point platform of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, as well as many of the English formularies prepared under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of Canterbury, have seemed to be more concerned with factors 3, 5 and 6 than with the others.

All these contributions taken together are important. Each has some light to shed upon, some inspiration to give for the solution of, the total problem. Their number and their variety is sufficient evidence as to the complexity of the issue, and perhaps to indicate that the evolving economy of the post-war world will be of an eclectic nature. On the level of economics, within history, Christian social thinkers are forced into a relative pragmatism which will try to do justice to all seven factors and appreciate the value of the many criticisms and proposals which emanate from so many quarters.

The complex nature of the problem and the varied answers to it, however, do something else. They demonstrate the dilemma of an economic culture which has created unemployment out of its greatest victory—industrial efficiency—and does not know how to deal with it without destroying itself in the process. Yet an industrial society cannot cut itself off from its own economic roots just because the economic nature of its culture leaves it in confusion. All it does is to vary the description of the economic nature without eliminating it, and the variations run all the way from ineffective temporizing and appeasement to the atavistic protest of fascism and the throes of war. On the level of history,

therefore, which includes the functional operations of economics, there is no fundamental solution to the problem. The best that can be hoped for, on this level, is a change of symptoms. For instance, unemployment may well be a passing phenomenon of the present century's economic maladjustment which will be succeeded in later years by equally if not more serious problems of other kinds, but in our day it serves as object lesson number one of the futility of seeking the redemption of history by the use of the processes of history, such as economics. It has already contributed to one war era and may contribute to others.

Yet where unemployment can be met through economic and political action, it must be met because it affects men's lives. Where elimination of "the profit motive", "production for use", making an effective and equitable balance in production and consumption, eliminating aggravating factors in the business cycle, bringing our 19th century monetary philosophy in line with present-day world needs, eliminating unnecessary seasonality, rectifying the labor market through processes of equity, dealing aggressively with the cartel problem for what it is—irresponsible economic power not just size; where all these and a hundred other valuable proposals serve to meet the problem somewhat, we join with the advocates realistically.

But we are aware that the problem of unemployment, together with its several contributory factors, arises fundamentally out of the ambiguities of the historical situation, and while practical solutions of specific problems must be attempted from within history, the fundamental ambiguities are not overcome thereby. Their forms rather change as history moves on. Herein lies our Christian insight into contemporary economics,

where we must live and work in an economic culture because we are born in one, seeking to ameliorate its inequities where we may, but at the same time not expecting to redeem it from within by means of its own processes. The dimension of the human spirit, which enables men to involve themselves in the ever-increasing intricacies of historic processes, transcends those processes. The confusion within the economic situation, as a more detailed study of any one of

the seven factors of unemployment would illustrate abundantly, is in large measure the result of that transcendence, and therefore it is futile to conceive of economic salvation—not only for the world in general but even for economic processes themselves. The post-war economic problem, so tragically and dynamically symptomized by the unemployment issue, requires that it be faced in perspective as well as in totality.

THE RELIGION OF LIBERAL POLITICS AS SEEN IN THOMAS JEFFERSON

By KERN EUTSLER

It is a truism to say that the events of the last three decades have delivered a death dealing blow to the presuppositions of so called liberal politics. Two world wars have more than indicated that human history is not progressing, automatically, in unending upward spirals. The systematic use of man's most brilliant discoveries, the crown of his intellectual powers, for wholesale destruction, and for cruelty, ruthless almost beyond comprehension, has blasted the confident faith in education as the panacea for all our social ills. We have seen that "enlightenment" and particularistic social alteration are not enough to render steady mankind's precarious social equilibrium. It is unnecessary to elaborate, as has been so often done, the obvious collapse of these and other presuppositions of liberal politics. On the other hand the inadequacy of these concepts should be particularly significant to Americans since these concepts are no upstarts of the twentieth century, but have a long and influential history in our nation, rooting as they do in that determinative figure for our national life and champion of freedom and democracy, Thomas Jefferson. The collapse is doubly significant to the Christian world when we realize that this political philosophy was based on a religious conception, at least purporting to be Christian, seen most notably in Jefferson. It is therefore of more than passing interest to see what aberrations of Christianity have con-

tributed to this general political point of view, which has proved to be so inadequate. For this purpose there is no better source to turn than to Thomas Jefferson, the father of American liberal politics.

Thomas Jefferson drew his thought from the historic sources of liberalism. He was a child of the Enlightenment. Professor Carl Becker in his book *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* has stated the essential articles of the religion of the Enlightenment as follows: 1) man is not natively depraved; 2) the end of life is life itself, the good life on earth instead of the beatific life after death; 3) man is capable, guided solely by the light of reason and experience, of perfecting the good life on earth; and 4) the first and essential condition of the good life on earth is the freeing of men's minds from the bonds of ignorance and superstition, and of their bodies from the arbitrary oppression of the constituted social authorities. Jefferson's religion certainly puts its main emphasis on these articles.

The two principles of Jefferson's religion might well be summarized in the two words "reason" and "morality". Religion, he held, was a matter solely between each man and God, and was to be thoroughly subject to reason and natural law. He firmly believed that ideal conditions would evolve if man became emancipated and enlightened.

The supreme position he gave to reason in religion may be seen in a letter to his young friend Peter Carr, giving him advice, among other things, upon religion. First he advises him to divest himself of all "fears and servile prejudices under which weak minds are servilely crouched". Then he advises, "Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness the existence of God because if there be one, he must surely more approve of the homage of reason than of blindfolded fear".¹ The Bible is therefore to be read as one would read Livy or Tacitus, and the testimony of the writer is to be judged in the light of whether or not what he writes is against the laws of nature. He cites a number of instances of what he means, stating for example: if we read in Tacitus that someone had made the sun stand still, as Joshua did, we would discount it. The same attitude of reason should be maintained toward the Bible. In concluding the letter he drives his point home by saying: "Your own reason is the only oracle given you by heaven."

In stating the great importance that he placed on reason it is well to note that he shared the eighteenth century idea of God as Reason—an idea that had been emphasized by such sectaries as the Levellers and the Diggers in the preceding century. In reply to a letter from John Adams which had chided him for not being a Calvinist, Jefferson took a broadside at Calvin's conception of God, pointing out that it differs violently from the "cosmogony of Jesus" laid down by him in the first three verses of John.

1. Gilmer, Lula Jane. "Some Aspects of the Ethical and Religious Thought of Thomas Jefferson." Unpublished Master's thesis, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Duke University. 1937.

After quoting these words in the Greek he says:

Which truly translated means, 'in the beginning God existed and reason (or mind) was with God, and that mind was God. This was in the beginning with God. All things were created by it, and without it was made not one thing which was made.' Yet this text, so plainly declaring the doctrine of Jesus, that the world was created by the Supreme Intelligent Being, has been perverted by modern Christians to build up a second person of their tritheism, by a mistranslation of the word 'logos'. One of its legitimate meanings, indeed, is 'a word'. But in that sense it makes an unmeaning jargon; while the other meaning, 'reason', equally legitimate, explains rationally the eternal preexistence of God, and His creation of the world.²

Thus Reason is supreme. God is reason, but most important Reason is God.

For Jefferson, therefore, orthodox theology was absurd because judged at the bar of reason it was unintelligible for him. There are few things against which he made a more vitriolic attack than theology. It is exceedingly mild for him to say, "we should not intermeddle with the particular dogmas in which all religions differ, and which are totally unconnected with morality." He begins to get "into high gear" when he accuses theologians of purposefully adding mystery to the simple enlightened religion of Jesus. He says:

... the metaphysical abstractions of Athanasius, and the maniac ravings of Calvin, tinctured plentifully with the foggy dreams of Plato, have so loaded it with absurdities and incomprehensibilities, as to drive into infidel-

2. Ibid. p. 202.

ity men who have no opportunity to strip it of its meretricious trappings, and to see it in all its native simplicity and purity. I trust however that the same free exercise of private judgment which gave us our political reformation will extend its effects to that of religion.³

Of all the dogmas of orthodox Christianity he seemed to have been more infuriated by the doctrine of the Trinity than any other. "Ideas must be distinct before reason can act upon them," he said, "and no man ever had a distinct idea of the Trinity. It is the mere Abracadabra of the mountebanks calling themselves the priests of Jesus."⁴ In a more optimistic mood he could confidently affirm that the mind of man was too far advanced to take seriously any longer "the Platonic mysticism that three are one, and one is three, and yet the one is not three, and the three are not one". Such "nonsense" he held had been perpetuated by priests to insure their power and guarantee their profit. "Sweep away their gossamer fabrics of factitious religion and they would catch no more flies."

Though Jefferson was loathe to say anything about religion in a public capacity, for he felt that the strong statement of his views might abridge the freedom of mind of others, yet he was often quite frank in his correspondence on the matter. In a letter to William Short he asserts the following aspects of theology to be "artificial systems,"

The immaculate conception of Jesus, his deification, the creation of the world by him, his miraculous pow-

ers, his resurrection and visible ascension, his corporeal presence in the Eucharist, the Trinity; original sin, the atonement, regeneration, election, orders of Hierarchy, etc.⁵

But this will all soon be past, for his unbounded faith in the powers of man's reason could lead him to say that the day is not far off when the mystical generation of Jesus, by the Supreme Being as his father, in the womb of a virgin will be regarded in the same category with the fable that Minerva was generated in the brain of Jupiter. Reason and freedom of thought in the United States, he strongly felt, would sweep away such artificialities and "restore to us the primitive and genuine doctrines of this the most venerated Reformer of human errors". Typical of the liberal position he saw "error" in the world not "sin".

But what has been said should not create the impression that Jefferson was irreligious, or that he discounted the importance of religion. Indeed he recognized its importance, and was anxious for men to get back to the simple, natural, rational, religion of "that greatest of all reformers of human error". In his own words: "The relations which exist between man and his Maker . . . are the most interesting and important to every human being and most incumbent on his study and investigation." Thus he went about the task of rebuilding his religion along rational naturalistic lines.

In the famous letter to Adams on religion, already referred to, there are interesting insights into his positive religious position. Adams, apparently, has written him that he hoped Jefferson would remain in health and happiness until he become a Calvinist. To which Jefferson replied that if Adam's wish

3. Ibid, p. 129.

4. Jefferson, Thomas. **Democracy**. Edited by Saul K. Padover. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939. (to Van der Kemp), p. 181.

5. Gilmer, **Op. Cit.** p. 154.

were granted he (Jefferson) would live forever, because he could never join Calvin in worshipping his God, which in very truth he felt to be a false God, a daemon, a malignant spirit. But then he enunciated the true religion of reason:

... I hold (without appeal to revelation) that when we take a view of the universe, in its parts, general or particular, it is impossible for the human mind not to perceive and feel a conviction of design, consummate skill, and indefinite power in every atom of its composition.⁶

After enumerating the marvels of the universe he concludes: that the evidences of an intelligent and powerful agent are so compelling, that in the long annals of human history men have believed almost a million to one in an eternal pre-existent Creator rather than in that of a self-existing universe. This is as far as he is willing to go discussing God, for he points out that even Jesus merely tells us that God is good and perfect, but that he does not seek to define him.

But the heart of religion was something far more than the conviction that God exists. The following statement contains the core of his religious position. He said:

It (religion) is more than an inner conviction of the existence of the Creator; true religion is morality. If by religion we are to understand sectarian dogmas, in which no two of them agree, then your exclamation on that hypothesis is just, 'that this would be the best possible of all possible worlds, if there were no religion in it!' But if the moral precepts, innate in man, and made a part of his physical construction, as necessary for a social being, if the sublime doctrines

of philanthropism and deism taught us by Jesus of Nazareth, in which we all agree, constitute true religion, then, without it, this would be, as you again say, 'something not fit to be named, even, indeed a hell'.⁷

In this sense it might be said that Jefferson outdid the eighteenth century philosophers. They sought to prove that there was no necessary connection between religion and morality. Jefferson's contention was that **religion is morality**. This is precisely the position of many who today would class themselves Christian liberals.

But the question is, "What is the foundation of morality?" In a letter to Thomas Law, Jefferson criticizes the various answers that have been given. The foundation of morality is not "the love of God," for many atheists have been virtuous men. Nor is it the **to kalon**, for many men have no aesthetic sense. Though self-interest is more satisfactory than any of these, even it falls short. He propounds the solution thus:

The truth of the matter is, that Nature has implanted in our breasts a love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral instinct, in short, which prompts us irresistibly to feel and succour their distress.⁸

Or as he expresses it in another writing:

Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this.⁹

7. Gilbert Chinard, **Thomas Jefferson the Apostle of Americanism**. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1939. (letter to John Adams) p. 523.

9. John Dewey. **The Living Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson**. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940, p. 83.

8. Ibid. p. 524.

6. Ibid. p. 201.

Morality, compassion, and generosity he held to be innate elements of the human constitution. He went so far as to assert that this moral sense is as much a part of man's nature as seeing or hearing or feeling. "It," says he, "is the foundation of morality." This sense, like the muscles of a man's leg, may be increased by exercise, chiefly in the form of education. He sums up, then, by saying that not only is man endowed with this moral instinct but nature has constituted social utility to man as the test of morality. Man is even more fundamentally endowed with this instinct than with reason. "The practice of morality being necessary for the well-being of society," he said, "He (the Creator) has taken care to impress its precepts so indelibly on our hearts that they shall not be effaced by the subtleties of our brain."

The problem for him, becomes then, a matter of finding a code that expresses the precepts impressed in our hearts. This he set about doing, weighing all ethical systems in the balance of reason. Early in his youth he copied, and perhaps agreed with the statement of Bolingbroke's that Christ had not revealed an entire ethical system which could be proved by reason to be the law of nature, but that a system collected from the writings of the ancient heathen moralists, Tully, Seneca, Epictetus and others would be "more full, more entire, more coherent, and more clearly deduced from the unquestionable principles of knowledge." But his quest for the moral heights led him to a quite different conclusion, namely that when the religion of Jesus is purged from the dross of theological nonsense it is the highest morality known to man, and it gives the highest expression to those precepts impressed upon the heart.

Abstracting what is really his from the rubbish in which it is buried, easily distinguished by its lustre from the dross of his biographers, and as separable from that as the diamond from the dunghill, we have the outlines of the most sublime morality which has ever fallen from lips of man."¹⁰

It was for this reason that he set about the task of dividing, in his now famous **Jefferson Bible**, what he termed the "gold from the dross". The dross he attributed to the stupidity of some of his disciples, and to the roguery of others. "Of this band of dupes and imposters, Paul was the great Coryphaeus, and the first corrupter of the doctrines of Jesus." For this reason Jefferson compiled from the New Testament what he thought to be the "gold". For instance, he was firmly convinced that "Jesus did not mean to impose himself on mankind as the son of God, physically speaking". At the same time he firmly believed himself to be a true Christian.

I am a Christian in the only sense in which he wished anyone to be; sincerely attached to his doctrines in preference to all others ascribing to him every human excellence and believing he never claimed any other.¹¹

Again his optimism becomes apparent as he sees man going upward and onward forever, for he predicts that "the genuine and simple religion of Jesus will one day be restored: such as it was preached and practiced by himself". This day will dawn when the clouds of darkness in which his truth has been muffled will be dispelled by education.

Though he recognized the sublimity of the morals of this "warm and pure heart," he still felt that human reason

10. Gilmer, Op. Cit. (Jefferson to W. Short), p. 132.

11. Ibid. (to B. Rush), p. 128.

and the innate moral sense of man did not confine the fundamental moral truths to any one man or sect. He therefore asserted that the interest of society would be best served by observing those moral precepts in which all religions agree. As he put it "for all forbid us to murder, steal, plunder or bear false witness." By the same token we should not meddle with those dogmas that have no relation to morality and in which all religions differ.

It is obvious that one who labors from these presuppositions would be a champion of religious freedom. Not only must the mind be free from all shackles of compulsion, but the rights of conscience were never and can never be submitted to government.

We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. . . . But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket, nor breaks my leg."¹²

Furthermore "reason and free enquiry are the only effectual agents against error." Uniformity is not only unattainable, but it is not desirable. It can only come by coercion, and the effects of coercion have already "made one-half of the world fools and the other half hypocrites." Difference of religious sects is a great blessing, for the several sects perform the office of *censor morum* over each other.

It is but to state the obvious to say that religiously as well as politically speaking Jefferson was a man of the Enlightenment. It is hard to imagine a better characterization of the religious position

of Thomas Jefferson, than the incisive summary of the religion of the Enlightenment given by Professor Becker in his *Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*. He says of the followers of the Enlightenment:

They had put off the fear of God, but maintained a respectful attitude toward Deity. They ridiculed the idea that the universe had been created in six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully articulated machine designed by the Supreme Being according to a rational plan as an abiding place for mankind. The Garden of Eden was for them a myth, no doubt, but they looked enviously back to the golden age of Roman virtue. They renounced the authority of church and Bible, but exhibited an naive faith in the authority of nature and reason. They scorned metaphysics, but were proud to be called philosophers. They dismantled heaven, somewhat prematurely it seems, since they retained their faith in the immortality of the soul. They courageously discussed theism, but not before the servants. They defended toleration valiantly, but could with difficulty tolerate priests. They denied that miracles ever happened, but believed in the perfectibility of the human race.¹³

The roots of Jefferson's political philosophy lay imbedded in the naturalistic political philosophy and naturalistic religion of the Enlightenment. Men, with their innate moral sense, guided by the light of reason, the gift of Nature and Nature's God, freed from superstition, bigotry, and all the chains of coercion that stifle the expression of the natural goodness of man, can live to-

12. Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*. (Boston, 1829), p. 166.

13. Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932, pp. 30-31.

gether in a state of accord and progressive harmony little short of that idealic bliss his worthy predecessors had called the "state of nature." Thus the only government which preserves the rights which nature has bestowed upon men is one that reduces its power and energy to the least possible minimum and allows the free play of the natural goodness of man, so graphically displayed by Jesus, which quality is the only true repository of liberty.

There seem to be three basic criticisms pertinent to this point of view. First, the history of free governments, and their all too easy degeneration into tyranny, demonstrates that natural man is neither (to put it mildly) innately moral, nor always guided by reason. This point of view fails to recognize the basic truth, which orthodox Christianity has always given fullest elaboration, that natural man always asserts himself, and his particular interest as the ultimate end of life. All things are thus not judged by a moral instinct, or by human reason, but in terms of the self as the focal point of existence. One contemporary commentator on Jefferson, after setting forth Jefferson's conception of natural morality paramously expressed by Jesus' life has these words, "Out of that simple Christianity was conceived the democracy that he blueprinted." That is precisely the trouble. He makes Christianity so simple as to miss the point. Not only does he make it a new law, but a law native to the natural man. This has been one of the more obvious failures of modern liberal politics. Unbounded faith that educational and scientific enlightenment would bring out the native goodness of man, and a consequent political utopia, has caused many liberals to scorn the constructive use of power in protecting man from himself. The logical ab-

surdity of this point of view may be seen in much contemporary pacifism.

The second criticism, which is like unto the first, is that there is no ultimate judgment under which our human efforts at government must always stand. Granted that a democracy is possible on these presuppositions there is nothing to prevent the majority from becoming as tyrannical as a dictator. To be sure Jefferson speaks against the absolute sovereignty of the majority but how does he safeguard the minority? He does it in this manner. He asserts that for the will of the majority to prevail it must be reasonable. But who is to be the judge of what is reasonable? The answer obviously is—the majority. When he asserts that though the people may be duped for a while, because man is a rational animal he will soon rectify the corruption, the practical implication is that the majority is always right. For all of his fear of undue power there is nothing to prevent the majority from confusing itself with God, for the only standards of criticism upon itself is its own reason. The role of safeguarding power is so negative that there is no check on the majority. Thus the door is open for the most vicious form of tyranny—the tyranny of the majority. There is no ultimate judgment upon government, there is not recognition of man's tendency to absolutize his relative ends, and man becomes the measure of all things.

James Madison pointed out that a strong government may move on to a greater degree of power at the expense of liberty, and that a weak one may move to further degrees of relaxation until the abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to an undue degree of power. With such great confidence in innate morality and human reason, Jefferson, apparently never saw this possibility. It

was because Madison stood more nearly in the stream of orthodox Christianity and did not share such an optimistic view of human nature that he was enabled to take seriously the fact of human corruption and devise a government which would protect men from the corruptions of both tyranny and anarchy.

Undoubtedly, if Jefferson had been the author of the **Constitution** he might have given government much the same structure that Madison did, but the use of safe-guarding power would have been entirely different, and hence the fate of American Democracy might have been very different also.



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CONFLICT, MUTUALITY AND PURPOSE

By R. CLEMMER

Two world wars in a single generation have confronted us with the ancient philosophical problem of the one and the many; the problem is, however, more vital now than ever before because the situation demands a solution not in formal but in existential or historical terms. Technologically we are one world; politically, socially, spiritually we are many worlds. If, in our diversity, we fail to discover or create a minimal unity we shall subject ourselves to inconceivable suffering and it is not impossible that in the process we may even destroy the very technology that has thrust us together. This fact is so apparent that all the means of communication, oral and visual, are burdened with plans and programs for achieving the desired unity and stability in the post-war world. It is not the purpose of this essay to inject another tongue into that Babel. Instead, an attempt will be made to evaluate the relative influence and significance and the inter-relationship, in societal organization, of the three factors: conflict, mutuality and purpose. It is hoped that this analysis will indicate, to some extent, the basic requirements for any genuine solution of the existing international problems.

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Man is not the only social animal; ants and bees, to mention only the most familiar examples, also live in groups characterized by differentiation of function and mutual aid. Man, however, not only lives in groups but he reflects upon the reasons for, and the principles of, his

group life. Moreover, this thought about human social existence is rarely ever purely descriptive; it is usually also normative and as a norm it becomes an important factor in the formation and modification of social life itself. Thus, social philosophy, or man's thought about his social existence, is not a mere appendage to, but an integral part of, his communal life.

In the history of social philosophy there are three principal types of thought concerning the foundations of social organization. They differ with regard to what is conceived to be the basic social fact. In the first type **conflict** is regarded as the basic social fact and is probably best represented in the thought of Thomas Hobbes. The second type finds in **mutuality** the basic social fact and is represented by Jeremy Bentham and John Locke. In the third type, represented by Aristotle and Rousseau, **purpose** is regarded as the foundation of social organization. These three types will be considered in turn and evaluated for the contribution which each has to make to the understanding of human social behavior.

Thomas Hobbes systematized the doctrine of universal egoism to which Machiavelli had first given expression. He declared that the basic motive of all human action is self-preservation, resulting in the attempt "by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can."¹ Thus, human life in the state of nature—a condition in which there is no common superior to enforce peace—is a

"war of every man against every man,"² and this conflict of interests between individuals is the basic social fact. Perpetual warfare, however, is inimical to self-preservation so every man enters into a contract with every other man to relinquish his power to a common sovereign. The power and effectiveness of the sovereign to keep the peace is not the result of the contract, however, because "covenants without the sword are but words."³ What really holds society together is the force exercised by the sovereign which compells men "to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of the covenant."⁴ The authority of the sovereign is justified only because of the security which it provides for each individual and when it no longer provides that security it has forfeited all claims to allegiance. Human group life is, therefore, simply an anarchy of conflicting interests into which a minimal order has been imposed by a superior power. In this view the state or government is virtually synonymous with force and its principal function is the negative one of preventing mutual injury.

It should be evident that a social organization such as Hobbes depicts is not a real society at all. Social well-being as such does not exist; only the self-interest of the separate individuals has reality. The individuals comprising the group remain separate, distinct particles; there is no interpenetration of personality and the individual units are unaffected by the processes of group interaction. Nothing new has been produced in the process of association.

The result is a theory of social organization which bears little relation to the actualities of human existence. Consistent egoists, as described by Hobbes, do

not exist and if they did exist it is very unlikely that they would relinquish their power to any sovereign. Certainly no sovereign, individual or group, could ever introduce any measure of order into such anarchy; social unity would be impossible. It is instructive to note that the societies which most closely resembled Hobbes' description, the city states of Renaissance Italy, were notorious for their instability and impermanence.

The basic difficulty in Hobbes' position lay in the attempt to reduce both psychology and sociology to exact physical sciences. He conceived of individuals in atomic terms: as separate, hard, impermeable entities who respond to external stimuli in terms of either attraction or aversion. This mechanical interpretation of human behavior is incapable of illuminating the depth and complexity of human personality: its capacity for modification thru contact with other personalities or its ability to transcend the interests of the self. As a result the philosophy of Hobbes was pitifully inadequate either to describe or explain the intricacy of interrelationships and the creativity of actual societies. The same criticisms, with some modification, are also applicable to Hobbes' successors who shared both his materialism and his analysis of society in terms of conflict: Marx on the one hand, and the "social Darwinists", Bagehot, Gumpлович and Ratzenhofer, on the other.

But if Hobbes failed to provide adequate principles for the interpretation of group life he did stress an element in human behavior which is fundamental, the motive of self-interest. If social life cannot be understood simply in terms of self-interest, neither can it be understood apart from that motive for no individual or group is ever completely emancipated

from it. This fact of human nature has at least two consequences which are of importance for any system of social organization. The first is that since human beings are impelled, at least partially, by self-seeking motives a purely voluntary society, entirely free from coercion, is impossible. In every society there are, and always will be, individuals who will not voluntarily subordinate their personal interests to those of the group or who will not voluntarily direct their acquisitive tendencies into socially approved channels. Such individuals must be coerced into conformity and any society which, in an attempt to carry out perfectionist principles, ignores this fact will soon find itself in process of dissolution. The second consequence of the motive of self-interest is that any stable and effective social organization must provide security for its members. Security is by no means the exclusive function of social organization but it is a basic prerequisite without the fulfillment of which the higher social values cannot be achieved.

The second type of thought about the foundations of social organization does not ignore the existence of conflict but finds the basic social fact to be, not conflict, but mutuality. Two kinds of mutuality may be distinguished: the mutuality of utility and the mutuality of rights. The mutuality of utility has seldom been more lucidly expressed than by Plato in the second book of the *Republic* where he puts the following words into the mouth of Socrates: "A state . . . arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. . . . Then as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when the partners and helpers are gathered together in one habita-

tion the body of inhabitants is termed a state. . . . And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good."⁵

This conception of the mutual satisfaction of individual desires as the basis of social organization was modernized by Bentham and the English Utilitarian school of which he was the founder. Bentham followed Hobbes in his analysis of human behavior in exclusively egoistic terms: the prime motive in human action is the achievement of happiness, defined as the maximum of pleasure offset by the minimum of pain. The purpose of social organization is merely to instrument this pleasure-pain calculus in a group situation. Bentham's individuals are just as atomistic and self-seeking as those of Hobbes; the only real difference is to be found in Bentham's belief that the recognition of the utility of social organization would reduce the necessity of the exercise of force by the sovereign to a minimum.

The objections and criticisms which have been made of the philosophy of Hobbes are equally applicable to that of Bentham: man is not an atom whose actions are determined by physical laws nor is he a consistent egoist. He is a being capable of standing outside of his personal interests, and any philosophy which neglects this fact must thereby ignore crucial areas of human experience and thus have an inadequate understanding of social solidarity and creativity.

The mutuality of rights, as exemplified in the "natural rights" philosophy of John Locke, is superior to the utilitarian mutuality of Bentham in the depth of its analysis of social behavior. The state of nature, or the pre-political state of man, is not, Locke declared, a state of the "war of every man against every

man"; on the contrary, it is a "state of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation."⁶ The state of nature is governed by the law of nature, reason, which "teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions."⁷ The purpose of government is not to impose order upon anarchy but merely effectively to safeguard the inherent, natural rights of "life, liberty and estate."

If one ignores the fiction of the social contract it is evident that Locke, altho less systematic, is more penetrating in his analysis of social organization than either his predecessor, Hobbes, or his successor, Bentham. He declares, in effect, that what holds society together is neither the force of a superior authority nor the cold, prudential calculation of individual utility but the capacity of the human reason to recognize the interests and rights, not only of the self, but of other selves. This capacity to recognize and respect the rights of others is the foundation of all systems of justice, of "giving to every man his due." The rights of others will be properly respected and safeguarded only when they are regarded as being of equal validity with the rights which the self demands for itself.

But if Locke's analysis is more penetrating than the superficially egoistic interpretations of Hobbes and Bentham it is still fundamentally egoistic. Social existence is still viewed and evaluated from the standpoint of the individual; the interests and rights of the self are **extended** to other selves but they are seldom **transcended** in the interest of society as a whole. If it is true that Locke's individual is characterized by freedom, equality and respect for the inalienable, natural rights of others it is also true that, when all is said and done, he remains an

individual having no organic connection with other individuals. Society as such is virtually as fictitious for Locke as it is for Hobbes and Bentham. Certainly it is true that Locke's philosophy is primarily of significance as a defense, in the 18th century, of the rights of individual liberty and consent and, in the 19th century, of the rights of private property.

The third type of thought about the foundations of social organization, which finds in purpose or will the basic social fact, is represented by Aristotle and Rousseau. Aristotle was not only a great natural scientist and metaphysician but the first to conduct an extensive empirical investigation of social phenomena. As head of the Lyceum he directed the famous inquiry into the constitutional history of 158 Greek city-states. His *Politics*, a work which in many respects may be regarded as the distillation of that study, is one of the most intricate and most realistic analyses of social forces and organization ever written. In the judgment of Professor Sabine "it represents a mastery of its subject—the internal working of the Greek city-states—such as has rarely been displayed by any later political scientist over any other form of government."⁸ Therefore, the conclusions of Aristotle concerning the bases of social organization are not those of an abstract theorizer but the result of the mature deliberation of an objective social thinker of the highest order. In the following passage, from the third book of the *Politics*, Aristotle declares that the basic social fact is not conflict or mutual-ity but purpose.

"But a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only . . . A state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are con-

ditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arises in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life. Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship."⁹

A modern political scientist, Max Lerner, declares that this insight is one of Aristotle's most important contributions to social thought. "I do not think that modern social thought has improved much upon Aristotle in this respect. While he gives us a naturalistic social theory of the organization of the state and its successive transformations, he does not fall into the trap of seeing human society in terms of biological and economic mechanism, for his conception of nature includes the ethical. It is the nature of human beings living in society that they must work toward goals which have value."¹⁰

Thus, Aristotle, at the very beginning of Western social thought, penetrated more deeply into the realities of human social existence than any modern materialist could possibly do. And the depth of his insight was due to the fact that altho he recognized the relativities and contingencies to which man is subject as a finite creature, he recognized also man's

ability to transcend those limitations and relate himself to a world of meaning and a scheme of values beyond himself. For Aristotle, as for most Greeks of his age, ultimate meaning was to be found in the life of the city-state, the society of free men who were motivated by a common conviction that the good life was a life in common. That this common life was a value that transcended the interests of any individual cannot be doubted by anyone who has read the Funeral Oration of Pericles, in which the greatness of Athens is extolled in tribute to those who "freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her feast," for "in magnifying the city I have magnified them."¹¹ Altho this does not reach the heights of *agape*, the self-giving of the divine love for sinners and slaves, it does, in a very real sense, go beyond the prudential considerations of all systems of mutuality. It is an indication that ultimately, even in non-Christian communities, love is the law of life.

Aristotle's conception of a common purpose as the basic element in society was generally accepted by social thinkers from his time until the dawn of the modern era. Christianity gave additional depth and strength to the idea by proclaiming the organic unity of all men by reason of their creation in the "image of God" and their potential divine sonship, and exalted the common purpose to that of worshipping, adoring and glorifying God in the community of Grace, the "City of God." It was not until the Renaissance concept of the completely autonomous individual arose that the idea of purpose as the social cement began to wane. The atomization of society in modern social thought was completed with the triumph of the mechanical world-view of Descartes and

Newton. Protestantism also contributed to this disintegration of the idea of purpose as the basic social bond thru the Reformation doctrine of "total depravity" and the Sectarian emphasis upon the "priesthood of all believers" to the neglect of the unity which all believers have in the Church, the "body of Christ." Thus, Luther had a political philosophy which bore striking similarity to that of the scientific materialist, Hobbes. The dominant note in social philosophy from the Renaissance thru the 18th century was, therefore, individualistic; it is not until we arrive at Rousseau that we encounter what Professor Sabine has called "the rediscovery of the community."

The life of Rousseau has been epitomized by Professor Randall in the following words: "Living in the Age of Reason, he was not of it; all his life he felt rather than thought."¹² In an age of materialism, of rationalism, of empiricism Rousseau started a revolt against reason which was to come to full flower in the Romantic movement. Looking into the depths of his own soul he discovered there motives and desires which no sensationalist psychology could adequately comprehend. The forerunner of modern "depth psychology", he declared that man is fundamentally, not intellect or reason, but emotion and will. Without denying that men are impelled by self-interest Rousseau maintained that beyond this egoism men also have an inherent aversion to suffering in others. Thus, the social bond is not so much a rational calculation of individual interest as an emotional response to the needs of others or the needs and purposes of the community as a whole.

This concept is elaborated in the doctrine of the "general will." "The general will alone can direct the forces of

the state according to the object of its institution, which is the common good."¹³ The general will, however, is not to be identified with the will of all. "There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter regards only the common interest, while the former has regard to private interests, and is merely a sum of particular wills."¹⁴ But if the general will is not the will of all, what is it? The answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand, the general will, viewed from the standpoint of the individual, is what the individual wills when he is thinking of the general good rather than his own selfish interest. On the other hand, Rousseau said that the community itself is a "moral being possessed of a will."¹⁵ The general will, viewed from the standpoint of society, is, therefore, the sum of the individual wills when those individuals are thinking of the general good. The general will, then, represents the well-being of society which transcends the personal interests of its individual members.

In fact, Rousseau was an extreme in the direction of collectivism as were his predecessors in the direction of individualism. For Locke social organization was merely an instrument for the safeguarding of the inherent, natural rights of the individual; for Rousseau society itself was the supreme value from which all individual rights were derived. Thus, Rousseau was not only the prophet of liberal democracy but also of totalitarianism, of both the fascist and the communist varieties. In spite of this overemphasis, however, Rousseau penetrated more deeply into the actualities of social existence than his individualistic predecessors. A. D. Lindsay has summarized Rousseau's contribution to social theory in the following words. "For all the un-

fortunate implications of the sovereignty of the general will . . . Rousseau is insisting on certain fundamental principles of social life which other theories miss. If men are to act together, their action must be governed by the purpose of the group. They come together to carry out that purpose and their deliberations are set to discover not what they want but what the purpose demands. The purpose dominates and directs their actions; it is, if one wants to use that word, sovereign."¹⁶

The conclusions derived from this analysis of the foundations of social organization from the perspective of the history of social philosophy may be briefly summarized as follows: Men driven, at least partially, by motives of self-interest come into conflict with each other. Self-interest, however, also brings about a sublimation and reduction of conflict, at least in its overt form, by reason of the utility to be derived from a mutual satisfaction of desires. Moreover, since men are ethical beings in that they seek to relate their conduct to normative principles, they extend to each other the rights which they demand for themselves. But most important of all, men are beings capable of self-transcendence and, as such, they share goals and values which extend beyond their individual, personal interests and demand of them loyalty and sacrifice. Without minimizing the reality of conflict in human societies, it must be evident that what makes them societies is not the conflict but the reduction of conflict by the processes of mutuality and the transcending of conflict thru the sharing of common purposes.

If the foregoing analysis of the foundations of social organization is valid the basic problem of the modern world is the creation of a world community mo-

tivated by common purposes and goals and directed by commonly accepted principles. To talk of achieving a world community by some more economic manipulation or political slight-of-hand is to betray a superficial conception of human nature and an underestimation of the gravity of the crisis in which we stand. Balance of power systems will continue to degenerate into anarchy and overt conflict and any new politico-legal structure will again be prostituted in the interests of particular national polities until such a community of purpose is created.

That such a community of purpose can be achieved by great numbers of people is most convincingly demonstrated by the modern national state. Internal conflict exists in nations but it is, for the most part, a conflict within community and not between communities. Or, to put it another way, the conflict is not so much over ends as it is over means of achieving commonly accepted ends. World wars will continue to rock the planet until conflicts of interest on a world scale are similarly circumscribed and transcended by a more ultimate loyalty.

It is hardly possible even to state the problem in this form without being overwhelmed by the tragic disparity between the necessary requirements for peace and the existing conditions. Not since the religious wars of the 17th century has the Western world been so deeply divided ideologically and two world wars have served to widen and deepen the chasms between conflicting groups. The national state, which was originally a significant triumph of community over the forces of feudal particularism, has itself become a new source of particularism and the primary obstacle to the extension of community in universal dimensions. More-

over, one of the most important factors in the creation of national unity was the cohesion produced by the stress of conflict with other national entities. Barring an invasion from Mars, this source of unity will not be available in the creation of a world community. The world community must be constructed in more purely positive terms than ever before in human history, i.e., in terms of positive allegiance rather than negative opposition.

But to what is mankind as a whole to give its allegiance? What is to become the object of universal purpose? If it is true that love is the law of life it is also true that men usually bestow their love upon idols. Certainly no relative, contingent object or value can be elevated to that position without becoming the source of new division and conflict. Ultimately mankind as a whole can only be united in allegiance to an object

beyond itself, the world and history. The question of ultimate meaning which every individual must face sometime during his life must now be faced by the world as a whole. It can no more be avoided in historical terms than death can be avoided in individual terms.

For Christians the answer is not something to be sought. It is already given; it needs only to be proclaimed. The world can only be united in allegiance to God and his purpose—the God who has revealed his purpose in the person of his Son. This answer neither eliminates nor minimizes the difficult problems of power, of economic and political organization. But it should free Christians from the delusion, which often passes for wisdom in the world, that peace can be built on might and power alone; ultimately it can be built only upon the Spirit of the God who is self-giving Love.

1. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part I, Chap 13.
2. Hobbes, *Ibid.*, Part I, Chap. 13.
3. Hobbes, *Ibid.*, Part II, Chap. 17.
4. Hobbes, *Ibid.*, Part I, Chap. 15.
5. Plato, *Republic*, Book II.
6. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Book II, Chap. iii, 19.
7. Locke, *Ibid.*, Book II, Chap. ii, 6.
8. Sabine, George, *A History of Political Theory*, p. 109.
9. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book III, Chap. 9, 1280a 31ff.; 1280b 31ff.

10. From introduction to Modern Library edition of Aristotle's *Politics*, 1943, p. 21.

11. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, Book II, Chaps. 43, 42. Quoted in Sabine, *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

12. Randall, John Herman Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 350.

13. Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Book II, Chap. i.

14. Rousseau, *Ibid.*, Book II, Chap. iii.

15. Quoted by Sabine, *Op. cit.*, p. 585.

16. Lindsay, A. D., *The Modern Democratic State*, Vol. I, p. 238.

THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRUCIFIXION AND RESURRECTION

By W. BURNET EASTON, JR.

That there are tremendous "wrongs that need me for the righting" is so obvious that it needs no elaboration. As a result most of ethics, Christian or otherwise, is preoccupied with the methods of righting the wrongs. This is natural and legitimate. But there is a more basic question, often ignored as irrelevant: Why try to right the wrongs anyway? or more simply, Why do the Good? In Christianity, at least, it is generally just taken for granted that we should do the Good. At times, however, and the present is one of those times, the more basic Question: Why do the Good at all? forces itself upon us. Particularly is it forcing itself on modern Protestant Christianity.

One illustration should suffice. In my denomination, for a number of years, there has been a youth program under the challenging title of "Christian Youth Building a New World." From what observation I have had, it was a well conducted program, probably not greatly different from similar programs under other titles in other denominations. For about a dozen years it has inspired, to a greater or less degree, our youth to go out and build a new world. In so far as anyone thought of raising the question Why? it was answered in terms of the teachings of Jesus. He had taught love and brotherhood; there are still areas of life where these virtues are not practiced; therefore Christians should go out to practice them. Q. E. D.

There is a great deal of truth in this. The Church must always inspire its youth to right the wrongs of the world. But now suddenly something has gone askew. Suddenly we find ourselves in a world which is being destroyed faster than it can be built. Even worse, most of the youth who over the past ten or a dozen years have set out to be the builders now find that they have become the destroyers. Indeed some of them make sacrifices of their lives in order to make the destruction more complete. Presumably some of these idealists will come back and enlist again under the same or similar slogans, but very few will have the same enthusiasm. Already most of them are bewildered and confused. They may not phrase the question this way but they are raising it. "Why do the good anyway?" "Why build a new world when it goes to smash before you more than get started?"

The question is a real question today and the old answer is becoming increasingly unsatisfactory. An answer is not the right answer unless it works under all conditions. It must be an answer that makes doing the good the right thing to do when the world is going to pieces as well as when it is a-building. Today, too many Protestants, brought up on a Christianity which consisted of little more than the idealism expressed in the teachings of Jesus, are raising the question whether Jesus and his teachings are not too idealistic to be practical. (This

is what is meant by the talk of putting Christianity on the shelf for the duration). Why not become a disciple of someone whose ideas seem a little more geared to this mundane world?

The question: Why do the Good?, at least in Christian terms, is a real one today. It must be answered and it must be answered convincingly by something more demonstrable than an appeal to an impossible idealism. There is such a convincing and demonstrable answer in one place and in one place only—in the Crucifixion and the Resurrection.

II.

Unfortunately we have raised an whole generation, both lay and clergy, who suffer from the "acids of modernity" and understand the Crucifixion only in part (which has been so distorted as to make its real meaning almost undiscernable) and the Resurrection not at all.

In general the Crucifixion has been interpreted too exclusively in terms of a sublime example, the noble and heroic death of a noble and profound teacher who preferred death to deserting his cause. The more religious have added that Jesus could do this only because of his faith in God. But the moral is clear: we, as followers of Jesus, are supposed to do likewise. People should be persuaded to become followers on the appeal of Jesus' ethical idealism. This is supposed to be enough of a basis for Christian Ethics.

For example, last Easter I wrote in "Christus Victor Newsletter" that the Resurrection is the *sine qua non* of Christian Ethics. It aroused a minor flurry. The position of those who disagreed was perhaps best stated in a letter which included the following:

"My conviction of these things (the victory of the Good over the

Evil) stems not at all from the Resurrection. I find it going back to Gethsemane, to Jesus' sheer act of faith in submitting to the Father's will. It goes back to the Cross where, after that cry "Why hast thou forsaken me?", Jesus with utter trust breathes these words: "Into thy hands I commit my Spirit". To me, these are more moving and demonstrable victories of the good over the evil than . . . (the Resurrection)."

This I think expresses very well a very large section of modern Christian thinking. In passing it might be worth pointing out that anyone who places his faith on the ultimate victory of the Good over the Evil in as doubtful a text as "Into thy hands I commit my Spirit" is on very shaky ground. (One of the minor phenomena of modern liberals is the way in which they use "higher criticism" to reject only what they do not like). The main point, however, is that this puts the authority for Christian Ethics back, or perhaps more accurately up, in idealism. It also misses a good two-thirds of the real significance of the Crucifixion, as well as eliminating the Resurrection entirely.

In the first place, to take one's stand here robs one of anything that can be called uniquely Christianity. (If Christianity is not unique, why bother with it?) It is true that Jesus was a very great ethical teacher, perhaps the greatest, but that must always be a matter of subjective opinion. And it is true that he died nobly with a profound faith in God. There is nothing unique about that. Other men have lived and taught nobly and died nobly with faith in God. One need not cite the overworked comparison with Socrates. History is happily studded with such noble saints. In-

deed today thousands are living and dying this way.

In the second place, neither is Jesus' death, taken by itself, any particular demonstration of the Good over the Evil. All it demonstrates is the sublime height to which the human spirit fortified by faith (and it need not necessarily be the Christian Faith) can rise in the face of adversity and an unjust fate. Jesus' death is unquestionably appealing, but we need today something more concrete if we are really going to fight to right the "wrongs that need me for the righting". We only get that in the Resurrected Christ, which has been discarded or at least dissipated.

The failure of so much of modern Protestantism to understand the true significance of the Crucifixion is due to two factors. One is that, under pressure of scientific rationalistic thinking, moderns felt that they could not accept the Resurrection as an historical fact and maintain their intellectual respectability at the same time. In so far as they retained the Resurrection at all, it was only a vague symbol, some sort of perseverance of good will (but of that more later). The result was that having lost this firm foundation for Christian Ethics, they were driven back to the Crucifixion and of necessity driven to an interpretation of the Crucifixion which emphasized it as a sublime example. There was no other interpretation they could put on the bald fact that Jesus was crucified.

The other factor is that modern liberalism (and in this we all are guilty) generally accepted the optimistic evolutionary idea of progress. Life is only somewhat bad and it is primarily good. True, there is struggle and there are setbacks, such as the death of Jesus or a war, but these are only temporary in the onward and upward march. Thus there is no

need for any miraculous intervention by God; there was really no need for a Resurrection. Churches could cheerfully organize programs on Christian Youth Building a New World, on the assumption that life is primarily just and improving and all that was necessary was to have enough courage (like Jesus) and the New World would eventually be built. This whole philosophy geared in nicely with their conception of the Crucifixion. It made an apparently good and intellectually respectable "Christian" doctrine. True, it was embarrassed by certain questions, such as: 'Why after two thousand years of Christianity do we still have war and race discrimination?' (To which they rather lamely replied: "Two thousand years is really only a very short time.") But they were too busy building to worry much. And they missed the true meaning of the Crucifixion and therefore the necessity for the Resurrection.

III.

Only to a minor degree does the Crucifixion signify the heroic example of a noble death. Certainly it does not signify the victory of the Good over the Evil. Rather, it signifies and is the most complete and ultimate expression of what classical Christianity has always said about life: namely, that as far as this world and human endeavor are concerned the Good is not victorious over the Evil; rather it is defeated by the Evil. Jesus on the Cross is the epitome not of hope but of tragedy. Jesus was the really Good Man—indeed the best, or at least as good as this world has ever known; and yet he, the really Good Man, was defeated and done to death by the combined forces of evil. If ever a man ought to have lived, it was Jesus. But he did not. Unjustly he was killed and

he died from all human standards of success a failure.

But thank God he did die the way he did. Unless he had, he would have given a false representation of what life in this world is like. Thus he participates in real life in a way that, for instance, Buddha does not. Thus his cry on the Cross: "My God! My God! Why hast thou forsaken me?" (Footnote: Of all the recorded last words of Jesus I understand that this is most likely true. Even if he did not say exactly these words they so completely fit the occasion that he must have said something very much like them) epitomizes human experience. It is the cry of all mankind. All of us who have lived at all have uttered this cry at one time or another. Today it is rising in a mighty chorus, in one language or another all over the world. Anyone who is not spiritually stone deaf can not help but hear it. Thus Jesus on the Cross is the ultimate description of what life is like in all its stark naked tragedy. If that is all, if that is the last word, if there is nothing more than heroic failure and noble defeat, life is not worth the effort. Then there is no real reason to believe that the Good will be victorious over the Evil. There is no real reason for doing the Good.

Classical Christianity, however, has always claimed that the last word was not the Cross but the Resurrection.

IV.

Unfortunately, tragically, the Resurrection is understood even less than the Crucifixion. Under the double attack of "higher criticism" and scientific rationalism, the Resurrection has become an impossible conception except in a most diluted form for many modern Christians. They simply do not see how they can defend or believe that a man died

and rose again. The whole conception of the Resurrection is embarrassing to them. They try to avoid it but they cannot because the high point of the Church year is Easter. Pathetically they try to revamp the Resurrection into something that is not "to the Greeks foolishness". It is the ongoing spirit of love or good will or hope. There is, of course, some truth in this, but it is pretty meager fare for people whose lives and world are crashing about them. Why go on building and hoping unless there is some guarantee that the hope has been and will be realized? Only if the Resurrection is recognized as an actual fact is there any historical evidence of the ultimate and complete victory of the Good over the Evil.

For all of us who are not Fundamentalists it is true that "higher criticism" and scientific rationalism have created problems in our thinking about the Resurrection. But neither of these destroy the ground for a solid and intelligent acceptance of the Resurrection of Christ as a fact of history.

I do not profess to be an expert in New Testament scholarship, but I believe that it is generally accepted that all the accounts we have in the New Testament concerning our Lord come from a period of about twenty to fifty or more years after his death. What we have in the New Testament, including the Gospels, is really a series of impressions He made upon the various writers. Moreover the Gospels come relatively late, and the earliest, Mark, was written from perhaps six to fifteen years after Paul's letters. Although Paul did not write a biography of Jesus he speaks continually of the Resurrection and on this score he is writing nearer the actual event than are the Gospel writers. One cannot read Paul without realizing that for him

the Resurrection was a fact of history and the *Sine qua non* of his faith.

The Gospels, too, very obviously make the Resurrection the climax of their stories. To throw out of the Gospels the Resurrection as an empirical fact is to distort them from the intention of their authors. Again in Acts, the message of Peter and of the earliest Church is the bold assertion that "this man whom ye crucified, God raised from the dead".

It is true that the individual Resurrection stories in the Gospels are subject to doubt. It is true that Luke, in Acts, may well have made up the speeches and put them into the mouths of his speakers. But these authors were using these devices to try to make clear in language what to them was the most concrete fact of their experience. Certainly the historicity of the Resurrection cannot be doubted on the basis of the New Testament internal evidence. If it is to be doubted at all it must be on some extra-Biblical evidence. This, it seems to me, is what those who reject the Resurrection as a fact have done.

Presumably because to the modern scientific rationalistic approach to life, it appears that they cannot accept the Resurrection as scientifically possible or rationally justifiable. I think that I accept the finding of modern science as much as the next man, but it does not create a difficulty for me at this point. Again, from my reading of the New Testament in the light of modern scholarship it is clear that the "body" in which Christ rose from the dead was not the same kind of a body you and I have. As far as the records go it had the capacity to appear and disappear at will. Paul made it clear that we are "sown in corruption and raised in incorruption". Moreover Paul's experience on the road

to Damascus may well be the prototype of all the Resurrection experiences. (As far as I know, no one doubts the validity of this experience.) In order to be an Apostle one had to be a witness of the Resurrection (Acts 1:22) and Paul was accepted as a bonafide, if turbulent, Apostle by the others. There is nowhere any record of their questioning his experience; apparently they accepted his experience as genuine. It is not unlikely that their experiences were similar to his, but were written in more anthropomorphic language.

A further criticism of discarding the New Testament evidence in favor of some more modern approach, is that it leaves us without any basis or authority for judgment in these matters except our own relative opinions. Then everyman's opinion becomes equally authoritative and we end in an anarchy of relative opinions with no way of preserving "the faith once and for all delivered". Indeed the present confusion indicates that we have already slipped dangerously far into this anarchy. I simply am not ready to put my inadequate personal judgment against a judgment which, until very recently, the whole Church has affirmed, and which the largest section of it still affirms. On the witness of New Testament and on the witness of all of the Church through most of its history, and most of the Church through *all* its history, the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ is an empirical fact for which I see no alternative.

V.

If then we can recover the full historicity of the Resurrection and as an actual fact without losing our intellectual integrity, we also recover the real justification for doing the Good. For the Resurrection, if it is anything, is the

demonstration of the Good over all that the combined forces of Evil could do. Why do the Good? Not because it is noble (although it is that), not because it is hopeful (a kind of helpless hope), not even because Jesus (and all other great teachers) have told us to. The real reason for doing the Good and its justification is that once in history God intervened and demonstrated that He guarantees the Good when he raised Jesus Christ from the dead. When Evil had done its most complete job and killed the Good, God, and God alone, raised the Good from human defeat.

"Jesus' sheer act of faith in submitting to God's Will?" It is only in the Resurrection that we see that faith verified. Without the Resurrection we have nothing but the example of noble, but hopeless courage; with the Resurrection we have the demonstrable assurance of the ultimate victory of the Good in spite of all the malignant power of Evil. This and this alone is the basis of Christian Ethics. This alone can make men work at "wrongs that need me for the righting" when the "wrongs" increase faster than the "righting" can catch up with them.

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Briefly I would add two supplementary points to what already has been said.

Too frequently where the Resurrection has been taken at all seriously it has been taken too exclusively in personal terms: i.e., the assurance of personal immortality. In nothing that I have said do I mean to imply that the Christian doctrine of Eternal Life is unimportant or that it is not bound up with the Resurrection. However, without minimizing the importance of the Resurrection for Eternal Life I feel that those of us who are interested both in social action and in sound theology should exploit to the full the importance of the Resurrection for Social Action. This is particularly important in view of the charge that we, who are returning to Classical Christianity, are "cutting the nerve of social action".

The other point is that in nothing I have said have I meant to imply that the life, teachings and death of Jesus are not important for Christian Ethics. Obviously Christians must always use his life, teachings and death as their criterion of what the Good in any given situation is. I have only tried to state, and state why, they, by themselves, are not the final justification for Christian Ethics.





BOOK REVIEWS



SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, by Nicholas Berdyaev. Scribners. \$2.75.

Berdyaev has written a tremendous number of books in recent years; and it is natural that there should be some repetition in them. In his new book he emphasizes his acceptance of the "existential" view of man, qualifying the essentially Platonic conceptions in which he was schooled by the interpretations which he has gained from Dostoievsky and Kierkegaard. His analysis of human freedom is an elaboration of the thesis that "man is a being who transcends and surmounts himself; the realization of personality is this continuous transcending of the self." He maintains his original idea of the evil and "fallen" character of the "objectivised" world. "In the objectivized world" he declares "matter is stronger than God". Here he agrees with Santyana in the essentially heretical position that the creation was really the fall, a position to which Greek orthodox thought is prone.

As he traces the various forms of slavery which are possible in the "objectivized" world he comes very near to a doctrine of total depravity. The various forms of slavery he enumerates are: 1) Man may become the "slave of being", which is to say that he may lose the freedom of personality to rationalized and generalized ideas of being as such. "Personality is more primary than being," he declares. 2) Man may become a slave to God if God is conceived as the Absolute. 3) Man may become the slave to nature as in modern naturalism. 4) He may become the slave to society as in modern collectivism. 5) He may become a slave to civilization and culture

as in those cultural religions which make man the tool rather than the master of the cultural process. 6) He may become the slave of self as in the various forms of bourgeois individualism in which self-worship achieves idolatrous proportions. 7) He may become a slave to the state or to his people. Berdyaev seems not quite clear whether he should regard only the state as idolatrous and the "people" as non-idolatrous; or whether he ought, as Nazism has taught us, to recognize inordinate love of one's own race as just as idolatrous as worship of the state. He finally decides on the latter interpretation after making provisional distinctions between the two.

Some of the other forms of slavery are "to war", "to aristocracy", "to property", "to revolution", "to class" and 'to sex'.

There are some astute observations in his analyses of these various forms of idolatry but there is no comprehensive analysis of the cause of man's constant involvement in idolatry, or of the reason for the tendency toward the inordinate in all of man's devotions. Also Berdyaev is able to draw much too simple distinctions between what is creative and what is idolatrous in the various loyalties and devotions in which men are involved. This prompts him to make trite observations about the difference between a good patriotism and a bad nationalism and other similar distinctions.

Sometimes it would seem that there is no redemption from this whole series of enslavements because "in the objectivized world all values are perverted. At other times Berdyaev seems to have a rather simple form of redemp-

tion. "The slavery of man—" he declares, "is conquered by the activity of all the creative powers of man." One wonders how such a form of self-redemption would be adequate to overcome the total corruption of the "objectivized world".

This is not Berdyaev's profoundest book; and it is questionable whether he illumines the human situation significantly beyond the point of asserting the transcendent freedom of man over all natural and historical processes.

R. N.

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MY LIFE IN RUSSIA, by Markoosha Fischer. Harper Brothers. \$2.75.

Mrs. Fischer is the Russian wife of the famous correspondent, Louis Fischer. Her personal account of her life in Russia, including the years which she shared with her husband, while the latter represented various journals as their Moscow correspondent, is a real achievement. It is primarily an achievement in integrity. With the artlessness of a completely honest person she records the deep attachment which she and her husband had to the great Soviet experiment and traces the gradual disillusionment of their hopes. The political facts which produced this disillusionment are clearly delineated but they are seen primarily in terms of their effect upon human beings, upon friends and acquaintances, upon young people and her own children. The disillusionment produces no bitterness in her soul and she indulges in no general condemnations. One may wonder sometimes whether her husband has not gone too far in his reaction to his former hopes. But his wife preserves a remarkable poise and generosity of spirit.

This is the kind of book which the ideologues of either side will not like too

well because it will not fit into their pattern. But it will carry conviction to all who are looking for light upon the Russian enigma.

R. N.

* *

A CERTAIN BLIND MAN, by Robert Elliot Fitch. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. \$2.00.

The subtitle of this book describes it as a volume of "essays on the American mood." The first chapter describes the blindness that has come over the western democracies, and particularly American. This blindness is described as materialism, hedonism and sentimentalism. The second chapter describes our isolationism and indicates its roots. The third essay points to our complacency in contrast to the demoniac energy of Nazi Germany. The fourth essay describes the partially dissipated American tradition and suggests how it may be restored. The final chapter spreads out a positive course for America in world affairs.

There is no doubt that the diagnosis presented in this book is sound and penetrating. It is a rewarding book and in a sense a shocking one. A vivid picture of an unhappy reality is worse than mere suspicions, however grim. There is ample scholarship in the volume though it disguises itself by means of a humorous and satiric style. At times the saltiness of the style made me wonder whether it could be endured by those who needed it most. On the other hand it may be that it may persuade people of the materialism of our culture more than weightier and more learned tomes would do. By means of its preaching, jokes and sallies it most certainly conveys a depressing sense of the pedestrian character of our outlook and its affront to man.

The author strikes at the transformation of man into "economic man". He deplores this in its capitalistic form. But he finds the same error in almost equal degree in orthodox Marxism with its reduction of sufferings and blessings to the level of economics. He defends the importance and relative independence of the ideal and spiritual aspects of life. "What we are forbidden to believe is any naive monism which should link our ideals only with this, or only with that material circumstance. The probability remains that our spiritual heritage has various connections with factors that are political, economic, geographic, racial and technological; but that the connection with no one of these is indispensable; and that the relationship between the two is always a reciprocal one of give and take." (p. 117)

While accepting this as a general truth we ought not to underestimate the degree to which the industrial process has qualified our ideas in the immediate past. Nor should we underestimate the degree to which a solution of the economic problem is a precondition of a better mental and spiritual climate.

Clifford Stanley.

* *

AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, by Gunnar Myrdal. Harper Brothers. Two Volumes. \$7.00.

This long awaited study of Negro-white relations in America, undertaken by the Swedish social scientist under auspices of the Carnegie Corporation, fully justifies the expectations of those who hoped for a really comprehensive analysis of the most vexing problem in our democratic life.

The two volumes contain a thorough analysis of all of the various aspects of the racial issue in America. One of the most valuable contributions of the study

lies in its refutation of all theories of racial antagonism which attribute it to one single factor, economic or political, historical or educational. Mr. Myrdal proves by his exhaustive examination of the data that every factor, which contributes to racial friction is involved in every other factor. His total theory, therefore, amounts to an analysis of a vicious circle, which can be effectively cut at a dozen different points and must be attacked from every angle, educational and political, economic and religious.

This is the kind of study which every thoughtful student of our American life ought not only read but possess.

R. N.

* *

FAITH, REASON AND CIVILIZATION, by Harold Laski. Viking Press. \$2.50.

This is Harold Laski's poorest book. His thesis is quite, simply that modern civilization is without an adequate faith or scheme of values, that Christianity was once the source of such a faith, that modern man can not longer accept Christianity, and that the only possible alternative is the scheme of values elaborated in Russia.

Mr. Laski is not certain whether to regard the Christian scheme of value as centered in its law of love or in its sense of the dignity of the person or in its hope of otherworldly salvation which beguiled the poor from seeking justice in this world. Nor is he certain whether to regard the latter characteristic as a corruption of true Christianity or as its real essence.

Laski's new scheme of values is sometimes interpreted purely in terms of Russia as its symbol and sometimes he gives it an independent definition. "If we are to build anew a scheme of values", he declares, "we must begin with the as-

sumption that the sole method open to mankind by which he can improve his lot is by the increasing mastery of nature." Coming at the end of an epoch in which the mastery of nature has aggravated rather than cured the conflicts of the human community, this is strange and futile doctrine.

In another connection Laski defines his schemes of values as follows: "The only working assumption upon which we can proceed—is that where the drive of a given society—is to make its material circumstances favourable to mass well-being the inner life of its citizens will be shaped toward the realization of happiness." We should have imagined that such a working assumption has been refuted by history almost as thoroughly as the first one.

Laski quite obviously regards Marxism as the religion of the future. But he never defines its political and economic program precisely or gauges its religious overtones carefully. Just why he should identify Marxism so completely with the "earnest" of the socialist ideal which we have in Russia is difficult to understand. It is the more perplexing since Russia as such, without too much reference to its socialist character, has become the idol of what is left of the communist party, and since Laski himself does not share this curious aberration.

This book must be sorrowfully put down as a pot-boiler, offering no real illumination to a perplexed generation.

R. N.

* * *

RELIGION AND WORLD ORDER, by F. Ernest Johnson.

This collection of lectures delivered at the Institute for Religious Studies offers the reader some helpful suggestions relative to the problems facing the world at the conclusion of this war. Most of

the lectures (with the outstanding exception of Professor Tillich's) stand well within the liberal social gospel tradition. Yet, one gets the impression that the work of some contemporary "realistic" theologians has made some inroads.

The definition of religion used by the editor will probably lead many readers to question the use of the term. In one instance he uses these words: "in essence (religion) has always been group celebration of the highest values of the common life." (p. 5.) There is serious question as to whether or not this definition is adequate to either the Jewish or Christian traditions. During the past few years the events of history have indicated rather clearly that there is a deeper dimension to life that has always been caught up in the religious experience that is certainly not included in the "celebration of the highest values". Professor Tillich's lecture brings out very clearly how inadequate this bourgeois humanism is in interpreting man and constructing a workable social structure. (pp. 19-22.) Tillich's criticism also stands against the conception of faith found in Felix Morley's lecture. Morley claims that the one serious lesson we should learn from the failure of the League of Nations concerns our "lack of faith in the goal of a balanced and equitable international order." (p. 196.) It is quite evident that Morley considers "faith in ourselves" and in our own ability to improve ourselves as the only legitimate use of the term.

Some of the other essays make it all too clear that progressivism is still held by a large number of religious thinkers. Rabbi Bokser makes the following statement in his survey of proposals for post-war reconstruction: "Life is not destined to be a permanent comedy of errors, for God is forever prodding man to use his

freedom in ever more righteous decisions. Through visions and suffering man is learning and growing; and the theme of that learning and growth is an integration of the various particularities of life in a pattern of universal harmony" (p. 78). One wonders how this form of faith in a cosmically guaranteed harmony can still exist in a world in total war. As Tillich points out, to believe in Providence is not to believe in the eventual coming of the Kingdom of God on earth. This belief only means that "victory over man's existential distortion is won from the point of view of eternity." Bokser questions the truth of what he calls pessimism in Niebuhr on the grounds that he considers social catastrophe unavoidable (p. 86). Aside from the fact that this is a misreading of Niebuhr (see p. 88 in Vol. II of the Gifford Lectures), one wonders whether or not Bokser has ever looked into individual and social life to find the ultimate contradiction between the egoistic self and the divine *agape*.

In most respects this book obscures the real complexities involved in reordering the world by too simple statements of them. At the conclusion of this holocaust we will all be faced with the most serious problems in the history of man. If we continue to assume that religion's only contribution is to furnish a corporate worship of our highest ideals, the reordering shall certainly fail. Mankind must be recognized for what he is, not for what we would like him to be. There are possibilities of real success and progress within history, yet these possibilities can only be realized if we take a realistic view of the nature of man. Man feels estrangement from his creator and wants desperately to be saved. This is the core of religion. The estrangement of man must be mitigated by a faith in God that

is not a reflection of man's own desires, hopes and ambitions. God's will runs counter to the highest aspirations and ideals of sinful men; consequently the worship of Him must not be the "celebration of the highest value of our common life".

A word should be said of the excellent lectures given by Henry P. Van Dusen and Raymond Leslie Buell. Van Dusen gives a very helpful survey of the various schemes for post-war reconstruction. He rightly emphasizes the fact that most of our social theorists have at last come to the realization that "the **problem of power** (is) the dominant factor in world order" (p. 54). He points out that the years between the two wars saw a bypassing and underrating of this factor in the minds of a great many idealistic thinkers. Our central problem concerns the reorganization of power, not the elimination of it. If this recognition becomes universal we should see a passing of the brand of sentimental pacifism that beclouded our thinking during the twenties and thirties. Buell says virtually the same thing in economic terms. If we are to reach our goal of full employment in the post-war world we must do it by maintaining a mixture of government control and individual free enterprise. Various economic powers must be balanced off against each other or we will sink into the inefficiency of a completely planned economy (as evidenced by the planning of our war economy) or lose any chance of full employment in the barbarity of *laissez-faire*. For the most part the analysis that Buell gives is based on a Keynesian foundation.

In spite of the unevenness of the book, it contains much of value for those interested in the problems of reconstructing the world.

John R. Everett.

THE CRUCIFIXION, a Poem, by

Mary Britton Miller. Scribners. \$1.75.

Modern religious poetry only occasionally rises above the level of the banal, the sentimental or the obvious. It is therefore an occasion for gratitude to come upon a modern poetic interpretation of the central fact in the Christian drama of salvation which catches the meaning of The Cross so profoundly and makes it so relevant to our own tragic history.

The Jesus who dies on the Cross is not merely a good man in this poem, who asks all of us to die sacrificially. Rather the Cross is the revelation of a divine love which must bear all the contradictions of history. For Miss Miller, the necessity of young boys engaging in the bombing of cities for the sake of bringing victory to a just cause, is the most vivid revelation of the tragic contradictions of history, as indeed it is.

She expresses the tragic significance of these bombings as follows:

"Fly up into the skies,
Archangels rise—
Intrepid boys—
Rise up like eagles,
Loose your bombs,
Your thousand tons
Of death upon
The hallowed town—
Murder the innocent,
Your angel wings
Are over us; —
Deliver us from Satan
In the name of Christ."

Lucifer taunts Christ with this dubious engagement in which his servants are involved, but Christ replies,

"I come to reap
The fields you sow.
The world is dark
Ah, darker far
Then when I hung
At Golgatha
Two thousand years ago"

It would be impossible to interpret the whole closely-knit argument of the poem without practically quoting the whole poem. It is a poem which might well take the place of a sermon in some special service.

R. N.

* *

STRANGE FRUIT, by Lillian Smith,
Reynal and Hitchcock, \$2.75.

Lillian Smith, Editor of *South Today* is a member of an old and honored Georgia family. She has a brother who is a prominent pastor in Atlanta. She came of a gallant and courageous tradition. In this novel, "Strange Fruit", Miss Smith undertakes what is well nigh impossible and succeeds to an unbelievable degree. She writes of Negro-white relations at the level which is most easily misunderstood and most dreadfully feared. She writes with the realism of an emancipated Southerner who knows human nature, contemporary society and God.

Perhaps even more startling than her treatment of the Andersons and the Deens is her understanding of revivalist Dunwoodie and the horrible travesty of Christian commitment presented by that ambassador of a dual worship of mammon and God.

With subtle understanding she has drawn the revivalist near enough to normal, with just enough of the hearty virtues we can admire, to prevent us from casting him aside as a caricature. Rather

we Christians seeking an alibi must look at revivalist Dunwoodie and see an uncomfortably close approximation to our own confusions of thought and deed. In the same firm but subtle fashion, the author reveals the gross and tragic hypocrisies of white superiority and self deception. One or two of the character delineations are weak but for the most part Miss Smith is a novelist of ability in both the elaboration of her story and the delineation of her characters.

Winnifred Wygal.

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THE VATICAN AND THE WAR,
by Camille Cianferra. E. P. Dutton
Co. \$2.50.

It is no easy matter for even the least "black" Protestant to keep calm when studying the official Roman Catholic position in either faith or morals, politics, world government, or ecclesiastical procedures. Nevertheless, it should be a part of the fair-minded attitude to attempt to look into the facts with as great objectivity as possible. In this case an objective study should be expected, for Cianferra was for many years *New York Times*' correspondent to Rome and the Vatican. He was the son of an American correspondent in Rome, was educated in Italy and was the authorized *Times* correspondent in the crucial years from 1935 to 1942 when he was repatriated to the United States and has since gone to Mexico City as head of the news bureau for the same paper.

There can be no question that Cianferra knows a great deal about both the Vatican and the whole development of Italian Fascism. He apparently was on quite intimate terms with many of the leading Fascists as well as many of the high prelates of the Holy See. The book shows constant evidence of his acquaintanceship with these leading figures. And

he is not without real knowledge of the history of both Church and Fascism, as well as the relationship of both to the contemporary world and the present world struggle. No one, as a matter of fact, could have lived as a professional news hound in Rome in those important years without getting a pretty firm understanding of the whole situation. This author has absorbed.

But what of the result of his study? He tells us that both the late Pope Pius XI and the present Pius XII have been decidedly anti-Nazi, anti-Fascist and pro-democratic. What he fails to stress is what is important to democrats and Evangelicals. He does not stress that Pius XI established concordats with the Fascists in Italy from the day they came to power; he does not stress that Eugenio Pacelli effected the famous concordat with Hitler in the early days of Hitler's regime; nor does he point out with much force the prayers and statements of cardinals, archbishops and bishops throughout the world which would indicate Romanism's friendliness with the whole ugly system of Fascism.

To be sure, when Hitler and Mussolini violated the concordats both Pius and Pius XII protested! Why, indeed, would they not? Their interests were involved. But when they did protest, they objected to the closing of their schools, harsh treatment of the religious, difficulties for their specific aspirations. They never objected on the grounds which were most objectionable to American Protestants at least.

Nor does Mr. Cianferra tell his more naive readers of the historic position of the Vatican in regard to our whole system of society, that system for which America is struggling. The Vatican's objection to Fascism plainly is only against infringement on its specific

"rights". But the Vatican has never been interested in anyone's else rights. Why not mention the attitude of Trent in regard to all those who do not submit to the Holy Father? Why not mention the Syllabus of Errors and its plain statements on separation of Church and State, secular education, etc.?

Pius may have been pleased to see Myron C. Taylor. He was doubtlessly delighted when Spellman came to see him via Spain's happy land and Franco's smiling face. He may have been happy to receive Roosevelt's words requesting his efforts to stave off the war. But this is opportunism, and it is papal self-interest.

We do not doubt that the Holy See by 1939 was able to see on which side its bread was buttered. Britain and America, the two great Protestant countries,

never supported Parochial schools and did believe in the separation of interests of Church and State. Yet never did the Roman Church have any difficulties in these countries, at least not in the last 150 years. The Holy Father did not choose to remember that until the war actually began. Even after Pearl Harbor the Pope chose to disregard the feelings of the democracies by establishing "friendly" diplomatic relations with Japan: specific ecclesiastical interests always come first for the Vatican, and always will.

The cleverness of this book is in the fact that it eschews obvious propaganda methods. The average layman in most Protestant churches would find it most convincing.

Adolph Behrenberg.

